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The Potential Effects of Electric Utility Industry Deregulation on Montana Power 
Company
Director: Dr. Clyde W Neu
For years, government officials and utility company management have struggled with 
the challenge of making electricity consumption in the United States more efficient 
and less costly to the consumer. To this end, the Public Utility Reform Act of 1978 
attempted to introduce competition in the electric utility industry, but only succeeded 
in rewarding the development of uneconomic power sources. In 1996, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took another approach with the issuing of 
Order No. 888, telling the nation’s utilities to open up their interstate transmission 
systems to non-discriminate access. This launched the electric utility industry into the 
world of competition, with expected savings between $3.5 and $5.4 billion per year 
from increased utilization of existing power plants and technological innovation. The 
result — consumers across the nation will be able to choose their electricity supplier, 
just as they can choose their long distance phone carrier.
Montana Power Company (MPC) has stepped into the arena of competition, in 
response to Order No. 888. This decision to embrace deregulation will cause MPC to 
change more dramatically than any previous action in the company’s history.
Critical issues facing MPC are: open competition for its customer base; geographic 
remoteness to larger markets; cost of production that is higher than market prices for 
energy; continued difficulty in receiving equitable treatment from the Montana Public 
Service Commission (MPSC) and a utility workforce that is unprepared for 
competition.
MPC shows strength in several areas that are as equally important in a deregulated 
environment: non-utility telecommunications, coal and oil & gas divisions that have 
flourished in the competitive arena; strong financial performance; a recognizable 
brand and the willingness of management to make tough decisions that will ultimately 
be the right decision for the shareholder.
One such decision MPC may face is merger with another utility. MPC was analyzed 
for its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in relation to several utilities 
considered potential merger candidates. This study reveals there is potential for 
consolidation that would make sense for MPC, in light of the changing world brought 
on by deregulation.
Preface
In early 1996, the issuance of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 
No. 888 set utility deregulation in motion in the United States. FERC told the nation’s 
public utilities to open their transmission lines to non-discriminatory competition, 
signaling a historic change in the way electricity is sold. Electric utility deregulation is 
expected to benefit the U.S. consumer and energy industry by billions of dollars each 
year, increasing utilization of existing generating facilities and lowering electric rates 
throughout the nation.
This paper will evaluate the changes in the electric utility industry from the viewpoint 
of Montana Power Company (MPC), an energy company with $2.8 billion in assets and 
1997 revenues of $1.023 billion. The evaluation of the effect of deregulation on MPC 
will take part in three sections:
I. First, an overview of electric utility deregulation, including a discussion 
on the stranded cost recovery issue and how MPC has chosen to deal 
with the problems surrounding stranded costs. Also, the first section will 
address deregulation of the natural gas industry and the changing 
relationship with State Public Service Commissions across the country.
II. The second section discusses factors for succeeding in a deregulated 
market, such as. cost and efficiency, transmission interties, employee 
skills, new technologies, regulatory treatments, financial strength and the 
ability to merge with or acquire other energy companies.
Ill Finally, the third section of this paper will address various impacts of
deregulation on MPC and will summarize the results of this study. This
iii
section addresses the new world of competition and changes in the 
Montana regulatory environment. A MPC company profile, along with a 
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis is 
provided.
Also included in this section is a financial analysis o f MFC and six 
utilities determined to be competitors and/or potential merger candidates. 
These utilities are: PacifiCorp, Puget Sound Energy, Idaho Power, 
Washington Water Power (WWP), Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and 
Edison International.
The hypothesis of this study is that MPC will need to merge with another northwest 
utility to effectively compete in the deregulated marketplace, because the market will 
demand increased efficiency and utilization of the former utility’s assets. In order to 
become more efficient, those utilities with more generating capabilities than load (such 
as MPC) will consolidate with utilities that have more demand than supply. 
Shareholders and ratepayers will successfully demand the efficiencies of the 
marketplace, which will result in the market efficiency envisioned by the FERC when 
Order No. 888 was issued.
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L Overview of Electric Utility Deregulation
On April 24, 1996, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chair Elizabeth A. Moler 
ordered the nation's public electric utilities to open their transmission lines to 
competitors, with the goal of expanding the wholesale electricity arena and ultimately 
lowering electricity prices for all consumers in the country. According to Chairwoman 
Moler, “Today’s actions by the Commission will benefit the industry and consumers to 
the tune of billions of dollars every year. They will give us an electric industry ready to 
enter the 21st century. These rules will accelerate competition and bring lower prices 
and more choice to energy customers.” She also stated, “The future is here — and the 
future is competition. It is a global trend, and in North America, we are at the forefront 
in embracing it. There is no turning back.”^
The catalyst to embrace competition came via FERC Order No. 888—the final rule on 
transmission open access.^ It requires public utilities owning, controlling, or operating 
transmission lines to file nondiscriminatory open access tariffs that offer others the 
same transmission service the company provides itself. The theory is this type of access 
to wholesale power will bring lower costs to electric consumers, ensure continued 
reliability of the electric power industry, and provide open and fair electric transmission 
services by public utilities. According to Chairwoman Moler, the cost savings expected 
from these actions are estimated between $3.8 and $5.4 billion per year in the United 
States.* It is anticipated the cost savings will arise fi’om increased utilization of existing 
power plants and from technological innovations that will lead to new, more efficient 
power production nationwide.
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Under FERC Order No. 888, all public utilities that own, control, or operate interstate 
transmission facilities are required to offer service to others under a pro forma tariff 
issued by FERC. FERC established the tariff as a guideline for minimum terms and 
conditions of service expected. These tariffs also must be used by the issuing utility for 
its own wholesale energy sales and purchases. Since Montana Power Company (MPC) 
owns transmission facilities, as well as generation and distribution, the utility falls under 
the direction of FERC Order No. 888 for its wholesale transactions.
Embracing this new direction is MPC Vice-Chairman of the Board and President Bob 
Gannon. According to Gannon, ‘'Economic history and theory instruct that competitive 
markets outperform regulated markets where no natural monopoly or (risk of) market 
failure exists. The introduction of competition in the telecommunications, trucking, gas, 
and stock brokerage industries demonstrates that competition can provide benefits that 
regulation cannot. In competitive markets, these benefits reward those who are most 
efficient and punish those who are least efficient.’*̂ Gannon proposes to first move MPC 
to competition in the wholesale power market (i.e. large, bulk buyers of electricity, such 
as municipalities, large manufacturing plants, etc.), then offer full choice to 
retail/residential customers over the next 4 years. Under this plan, MPC’s generation 
assets would immediately become unregulated and the company would cease to be 
vertically integrated. When this happens, arms-length, cost-based agreements would be 
structured between the unregulated generation (supply) division and the regulated 
(energy services) division. This would allow the production arm of the company the 
flexibility to compete in the open market for MPC’s large industrial loads, the first of
3
MFC’s customer base able to seek a new energy supplier. These are the customers 
being courted by other energy suppliers, such as neighboring Northwest utilities and 
stand alone independent power producers who now will be given access to such 
customers. Likewise, the production arm also will be able to look for potential new 
customers in other service territories previously untouchable.
At the same time, the majority of MFC ’s 270,000 residential and small retail customers 
would continue to see cost-based rates, regulated by the Montana Fublic Service 
Commission (MFSC), for the next 4 years. This action protects approximately $375 
million of the $452 million annual revenue stream of the company see Exhibit 1 (FRC- 
08, pg. 2, Column B). The other key point of MFC’s plan addresses the need for a 5- 
year transition period, where “stranded costs” would be recovered from the customer 
base. MFC’s proposal anticipates the transition period would start six months after a 
final MFSC order on restructuring in Montana.
While it was initially the company’s intent to seek recovery of its stranded generating 
costs over a 5-year transition period, discussion at the end of the next section will reveal 
a change of course for MFC. It is informative to discuss the stranded cost issue from 
MFC’s viewpoint, prior to its decision to go a new direction.
Stranded Costs
Besides opening up the nation’s electric utilities to deregulation. Order No. 888 also 
provides for the full recovery of stranded costs—that is, costs that were prudently 
incurred to serve wholesale power customers and that could go unrecovered if these 
customers use open access to move to another supplier. FERC will permit a public
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Utility to seek recovery of wholesale stranded costs from departing customers via direct 
assignment of the stranded costs created by each customer’s departure. The costs must 
be verifiable, prudently incurred, and there must have been a reasonable expectation of 
continuation of electric service on the part of the utility. FERC Order No. 888’s 
stranded cost recovery clause for wholesale power contracts states that recovery is 
possible only on contracts signed before July 11, 1994. After that date, recovery must 
by specifically provided for in the contract.
Stranded costs can be incurred in one of two ways:
1. Investment in generating assets with a cost to generate electricity that is out- 
of-market. Out-of-market costs are defined as those costs incurred by a utility in 
a regulated environment, where cost recovery was in essence guaranteed as part 
of the utility franchise, that are now greater than what the market will pay for 
similar services in a competitive environment. Out-of-market costs for Montana 
Power are illustrated by Exhibit 2 (RJL-1, Net Hydro & Thermal Out-of-Market 
Cost)." Under the old regulation, MPC’s ratepayers would have been asked to 
pay for approximately $58 million more in 1998 generating costs than they 
would reasonable expect to pay under deregulation.
2. Wholesale power contracts entered into by the utility, normally qualifying 
facility (QF) contracts that are out-of-market. Qualifying facilities were 
established through the Public Utility Reform Act of 1978, as an attempt to 
introduce competition in the electric utility industry. Public utilities were 
required to purchase all the generation from QFs that chose to locate within the
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service territory of the utility. QF generation was sold into the utility 
transmission grid at the cost of the QF s production, plus a profit. In almost all 
instances, the QF cost was much higher than the utility’s generation cost. An 
example of the effects of QFs can be seen by reviewing MPC’s power supply 
costs (and their respective delivered KWh’s). There are three major components 
to the company’s generation base:
% o f Costs % o f KWh delivered
1. Hydro Facilities 28% 37%
2. QF Contracts 23% 9%
3. Thermal Facilities 49% 54%
Note the effect QFs have on both the cost structure and actual energy supply of the 
company. This discussion will avoid a lengthy analysis on the previous legislative 
wisdom of forcing utilities nationwide to purchase power from uneconomic QFs. The 
percentages above speak to the effect QFs have had on MFC and its ratepayers. Over 
$26 million/year has been paid to QFs in the state of Montana. Without an economic 
incentive to be efficient, QF s have been a detriment to the development of efficient 
energy in the United States.
The main focus of MPC’s Electric Restructuring Informational Filing (Docket No. 
96.12.206) and the follow-up Electric Restructuring Transition Plan Filing (Docket 
D97.7.90), is to assign the existing power supply cost-of-service, that would otherwise 
be stranded, to the various customer classes. This is a defensive strategy that will collect 
the company’s embedded power supply cost fi’om existing customers through normal
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billing and also from customers wishing to exit MPC’s system anytime during the four 
year transition period. An exit fee, based on stranded costs, would be imposed prior to 
early departure.
The existing generation and transmission assets would be removed from the regulated 
ratebase and the return on, and return of, these assets through a cost-of-service 
calculation would be replaced with a cost-based supply contract between the 
unregulated Energy Supply Division and the regulated Energy 
Services/Telecommunications Division of Montana Power Company. The term of the 
contract would coincide with the proposed transition period and would eliminate the 
company’s stranded costs concerns by the end of the four-year transition period.
Exhibit 2, Net Hydro & Thermal Out-of-Market Cost, taken from Mr. John Leland’s 
testimony in the Electric Restructuring Transition Plan Filing, shows graphically the 
potential hydro and thermal stranded costs if market prices are assumed at a medium 
market price for delivered power on MPC’s system. Mr. Leland is the manager of the 
Electric Resource Planning and Economic Analysis Department at MPC. As such, his 
responsibilities include determining MPC customers’ future electric resource needs, 
within the guidelines established by the MPSC. According to Mr Leland’s graph, 
approximately 1/3 of MPC ’s power supply cost is out-of-market and therefore would be 
considered stranded cost if MPC’s system opened up to full competition today.
While in the transition period, this structure will make little difference to the typical 
MPC residential customer, because residential utility rates still will be based on a power 
supply contract with a cost-of-service basis, not market prices.
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The purpose of such a relatively long transition period is to allow for the recovery of 
stranded costs and give the company some form of protection until a fiill organizational 
restructuring o f the company can be accomplished. To allow existing MPC customers a 
choice (albeit an expensive one that effectively eliminates true market choice), MPC 
proposes a “market access rate” to cover stranded costs and accommodate customers 
who can and want to enter the competitive marketplace. The direct market access rate 
would have several components.
•  A transition charge based on hydro and thermal out-of-market costs during 
the transition period.
• A transition charge based on purchase power (QF) contracts out-of-market 
during the transition period.
• A transition charge to collect approximately $12.9 million annually on 
regulatory assets of $258.2 million.^ Regulatory assets are deferred 
accounting costs that have value because of prior regulatory treatment. 
These costs were not previously collected in rates at the time the service was 
provided and include such items as conservation resource acquisition, 
deferred income taxes, and employee benefits/compensation.
• A Universal Systems Benefit Charge (USBC) to cover the cost of energy 
conservation/demand-side management, low-income energy assistance 
programs, development of renewable energy sources, and other research and 
development costs. The logic behind the USBC is to insure all users pay for 
certain investments that benefit society as a whole. The belief is a
8
competitive marketplace would not otherwise provide a revenue pool for 
such investments. The USBC charge would be non-bypassable, meaning it 
would be a fixed charge paid by everyone on the system.
Mr Leland provides extensive testimony on the company’s calculations to determine 
stranded costs for both existing thermal and hydro facilities and wholesale power 
contracts (see Exhibit 3- Graph 11). The proposed stranded cost recovery rate (shown as 
the right-downward slanting lines in the transition period) assumes the medium market 
price. The “wedge” represents the dollar risk to MPC shareholders if the market price 
falls below the medium forecast. The amount of the wedge from July 1998 to July 2002 
is present-valued at approximately $59 million. Looking from 2002 to 2013, MFC is 
still at considerable risk, until the medium forecast exceeds the hydro and thermal costs. 
The total present value dollars at risk during this period are $346 million. This risk goes 
up to $625 million if the low market price forecast proves accurate.
These risks undoubtedly weighed heavily in Bob Gannon’s December 9, 1997 
announcement of the company’s intent to sell MFC’s coal-fired and hydroelectric 
plants. In comments at the annual shareholders meeting in May 1998, Gannon said, 
“The decision was made because:
• Many of the utilities involved in industry-restructuring and customer choice were 
involved in processes to sell their generation to resolve state stranded-cost issues
•  As Montana Power looked at the prices being paid for generation, questions were 
raised about what our assets might bring, and whether we would have stranded 
costs.
9
•  And the risk-reward nature of the generation business was, and still is, dramatically 
changing — with increasing risk being part o f the equation.”
“We also had been testing the forward market for electric power supplies,” Gannon 
said. “We found two things: Price volatility, and low prices. Over the next four to five 
years, the prices for electricity were coming out at less than our costs of production. We 
saw that situation as very challenging — the prospect of incurring tens of millions of 
dollars of losses for several years, while waiting for the market to turn. As a small 
player in this consolidating generation market, we believed that it would be too risky in 
the future for us to stay in this business, and that now is the time to exit.”^
This decision has eliminated a lengthy debate with the MPSC and Montana Consumer 
Council (MCC) over stranded costs and has moved MPC away from a defensive 
strategic approach to deregulation. However, there will still be opposite views on how 
much of the sale proceeds will be returned to the ratepayers.
California — The Bellwether State for Deregulation
The path MPC is currently able to pursue has come about in great measure due to the 
efforts of not only FERC, but the utilities and the California Public Utility Commission 
in California. Since 1992, the CPUC has been working toward full retail open access. 
The state began its efforts to deregulate after the passage of the Federal Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, which was intended to introduce greater market competition to the energy 
industry, thereby improving efficiency and reducing rates to customers. On September 
24, 1996, Governor Pete Wilson signed into law legislation that would open the state’s 
electricity market to competition over the next 5 years. However, the timetable was
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changed to move California to fiill (unrestricted) open access effective January 1, 1998. 
The law put to an end the practice of a single utility providing all electric service within 
its service territory, introducing choice and competition to end users, i.e. the retail 
customers.
California has developed a framework for competition with the establishment of an 
independent power pool known as the Western Electric Power Exchange (WEPEX). 
The function of the WEPEX is to:
• Establish a preferred schedule of generation (supply) offers and demand bids
• Administer transparent and nondiscriminatory bidding protocols
• Establish necessary information links to Independent System Operator (ISO) 
and market participants
During the original five-year transition period, which is still intact, all generators of 
electricity (both in state and out-of-state) will sell their power into the WEPEX and 
transmit power across a statewide ISO transmission grid. All power will be sold into the 
Exchange until a viable market value has been established for the state’s generating 
assets. Neither the WEPEX or ISO will have financial interest in any source of 
generation or transmission facilities. The WEPEX will work to match generation 
(supply) sold into WEPEX with demand bids from utilities, power marketers, and 
others, ranking generation supply on a least-cost basis. It will serve as a clearinghouse 
by providing an auction point for hourly or half-hourly price signals aimed at immediate 
users and long-term investors. The Exchange also determines a preferred schedule of 
delivery o f power to the ISO and serves as load procurer for those California customers
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not represented by brokers or marketers. The goal of the WEPEX is to establish a 
visible spot market, open to all suppliers, both in-state and regionally through the 
Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC). However, as explained later, 
California’s current transmission pricing does penalize those desiring to enter the 
WEPEX from outside the state. The WEPEX, WSCC, along with MPC’s proposed 
transmission structure, is discussed in greater detail in the Transmission Intertie section. 
Purpose and Result of Deregulation in Natural Gas Transmission 
What MPC and the California utilities are pursuing, to enact non-discriminatory open 
access in the electric industry, has roots in the opening of the nation’s natural gas 
transmission lines in the late 1980’s. In the landmark 1988 court case, Associated Gas 
Distributors (AGD) vs. FERC, the issue revolved around whether FERC had the 
authority to order industry-wide non-discriminatory open access as a remedy to undue 
discrimination in interstate natural gas transmission services.^ Opponents contended that 
FERC did not have the authority to force a gas transmission company to be a “common 
carrier” of natural gas for other gas suppliers, as a condition of receiving authorization 
to transport its own gas across interstate lines.
The Washington D C Circuit court affirmed, in fact considered it a responsibility of the 
FERC, to order the filing of non-discriminatory open access transmission tariffs by any 
company wanting to transport gas across interstate lines. This was done as a remedy for 
undue discrimination or anti-competitive behavior. The court found that in most 
situations, discrimination that precludes transmission access or gives inferior access will
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have at least potential anti-competitive effects, because it limits access to markets and 
therefore limits competition.
Similarly, it is probable that any transmission provision that has anti-competitive effects 
also would be found to be unduly discriminatory or preferential because the anti­
competitive provision would most likely favor the trcinsmission owner over others. The 
FERC enforces this ruling by denying certification (and therefore permission to 
transport interstate natural gas) to any company that does not file non-discriminatory 
open access tariffs with the FERC.
Today's natural gas industry looks quite different than it did in 1978. Natural gas 
producers are unregulated (except for safety and environmental restrictions), there are a 
large number of producers (as well as aggregators, brokers, marketers, and others) that 
compete aggressively to sell commodities. By most indications, performance in the 
natural gas industry has improved dramatically.
This competition has lowered natural gas prices considerably. According to Kenneth W. 
Costello and Daniel J. Duann, in their 1996 article. Turning up the Heat in the Natural 
Gas Industrv,̂  “from 1984 to 1993 wellhead price declined by 24 percent. Natural gas 
prices have fallen from their mid-1980s levels to the point where retail gas consumers 
cumulatively saved as much as $100 billion. During the period 1984 to 1993 the 
average retail price of natural gas declined by 16 percent.
The pipeline and distribution sectors have experienced significant improvements in 
productivity as well. During the period 1984 to 1993, for example, labor productivity in
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these sectors improved by 24 percent, and operation and maintenance expenses per unit 
declined by 18 percent.”
One conspicuous outcome since the mid-1980s has been the decline in the retail price of 
gas for large customers relative to small customers (for example, residential and certain 
commercial customers). Wellhead gas prices have decreased more during non-winter 
periods, which disproportionately benefits customers with high load factors (e.g., 
industrial customers), and the prices of transmission and distribution services have 
fallen more for large customers, such as industrial and electric utility customers. During 
the period 1984 to 1993, for example, residential customers benefited from a 12 percent 
decline in the real price of transmission and distribution services, while industrial and 
electric utilities enjoyed 63 percent and 55 percent declines, respectively.
Whether the movement of gas rates in this direction reflects an undesirable outcome is 
debatable. It may simply reflect gas service providers’ price discrimination in favor of 
price-elastic customers. With more competition and regulatory flexibility, providers 
would be expected to have a greater inclination and ability to price on the basis of 
market conditions. With large customers having more market choices, it is not 
surprising that they were able to enjoy larger rate declines. Costello and Duann go on to 
say, “Overall, the pattern of gas rates has probably improved economic efficiency: it 
reflects the pressures placed by market forces to reduce the size of cross-subsidies. As 
of 10 years ago, large customers were subsidizing other customers. The changed pattern 
o f retail rates since that time represents a movement toward cost-based rates. The 
general impression of industry observers is that industrial customers were subsidizing
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Other customers. Unlike the cases of the telecommunications and electric power 
industries, there has been little formal study of this issue.”^
In any event, there is a legitimate concern that small retail customers, relative to other 
gas customers, may have received too few of the benefits fi"om the recent reforms in the 
natural gas industry. One can argue that this phenomenon is the typical pattern in public 
utility industries encountering major restructuring—large customers receive most of the 
benefits during the initial years, while a broader group of customers has to wait longer 
The dispersion of benefits across all gas customer groups will necessitate a more 
broadly competitive retail gas market than what currently exists.
In summary, affirming that FERC had the authority to force natural gas companies to 
open access to their (pipeline) transmission systems helped set the stage for today’s 
opening of the nation’s electric transmission systems.
New Relationship with State Public Service Commissions 
Change in Scope and Purpose
Traditionally, the federal government concerned itself with regulating the wholesale 
power market, leaving the regulation of retail power (sale to the ultimate customer) and 
the energy companies within the state up to the state public service commission. 
Regulation o f retail power within the state included such things as insuring adequate, 
reliable electric service to all customers at the lowest total cost. Also, state PSC’s were 
charged with the oversight of the planning, construction and operation of the generation, 
transmission and distribution systems within the state.
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Sorting out which regulatory body will have authority in the future, FERC or the State 
PSC, is a complex issue. If the goal of FERC Order No. 888 is eventual universal access 
for all 115-million retail electric customers in the U.S., then the federal government 
must step into the State’s jurisdiction to insure all customers have choice. This causes 
many state PSC’s some concern. Such issues as jurisdiction over the siting of major 
generation and transmission facilities, fairness to the state’s retail customers and the 
historical retail customer funding of soon-to-be deregulated generating assets are all 
questions needing to be answered by those structuring the new competitive 
environment.
In Montana, the MPSC has a great deal of power over utility companies in the state and 
therefore is understandably concerned over the potential erosion of authority when two 
of the three major components of MPC (generation and transmission) will fall outside 
MPSC jurisdiction. This will leave only MPC’s distribution fimction under MPSC 
control. Generation and transmission will fall under FERC jurisdiction.
For many years the relationship between the MPSC and businesses in the state (both 
utilities and large utility customers) has been strained. The MPSC is considered by 
many to be one of the most hostile PSCs in the country. This distinction may come from 
the fact that the MPSC is an elected body and therefore responds to the consumer class 
with the greatest vote: residential customers. The successful election battlecry for the 
politician seeking a term with the MPSC is to promise low residential rates, high rates 
for “big business” and stiff opposition to any utility company rate filings. While 
insuring a contented voting constituency, the effect of these political actions has
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allowed a cross-subsidy of the residential class that has set up a scenario for other 
energy sellers now coming into the market to “cherry pick” MPC’s largest customers 
(see Impact of Deregulation on MFC—The New World of Competition).
The implementation of FERC Order No. 888 sets the stage for this to be played out, as 
the following scenario suggests. As the cherry picking occurs, the larger customers will 
exit MPC’s system, leaving the smaller customer classes (residential, small businesses, 
etc ) to absorb remaining fixed costs. Along with the exodus of the larger customers, 
residential rates will skyrocket and MPC will become financially unhealthy and 
increasingly vulnerable to takeover.
Change o f Jurisdiction
Drawing the jurisdictional line between FERC and the state regulatory authority 
becomes an important step in establishing a new working model for open access. This is 
true not so much for wholesale transactions, because they naturally occur at the higher 
voltage transmission level and therefore fall under FERC jurisdiction, but for retail 
transactions that will occur more and more often as the nation opens up to full access 
for all customers.
In instances o f unbundled retail energy delivery, where a low voltage user seeks its own 
power supply, FERC will defer to recommendations by the state regulatory body as to 
where the jurisdictional bounty should be drawn, as long as the boundaries follow 
FERC’s 7-point guideline on the critical question: Where does transmission service end 
and distribution service begin?
FERC Order No. 888 establishes the seven indicators:^
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1. Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail customers
2. Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character
3. Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever, flows out
4. When power enters a local distribution system, it is not reconsigned or
transported on to some other market
5. Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a comparatively
restricted geographic area
6. Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure
flows into the local distribution system
7. Local distribution systems will be reduced voltage
FERC states its intent is to keep state regulatory authority intact, with the state 
continuing to have authority over local distribution, historical state franchise areas, and 
state laws governing retail marketing areas of electric utilities. Although disputed by 
several state regulators in a Fitch research article (see “Ability to stay the same, merge 
with or acquire other energy companies” section, concerns of Susan F Clark, Florida 
PSC Chairwomen), FERC explicitly states in Order No 888 that it will not affect or 
encroach upon state authority in such traditional areas as: the authority over local 
service issues, including reliability of local service; administration of integrated 
resources planning and utility buy-side and demand-side decisions; authority over utility 
resource portfolios; generation transmission siting; and authority to impose non- 
bypassable distribution and retail stranded cost charges.
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In Montana, it remains to be seen how the authority o f the MPSC will be effected by 
FERC s new direction with transmission. Since utility customers will no longer be 
looked upon to pay cost-based rates for generation (while transmission will still be 
primarily cost-based), the MPSC role will be reduced to looking at whether MPC 
purchased power (either from itself or others) at an appropriate market price. This will 
occur instead of scrutinizing every new generation construction or maintenance project 
the company plans. In the future, if MPC chooses to invest in the reconstruction or 
upgrade of a dam, the costs of such a project will need to be justified on the value of 
that resource in the marketplace, not on whether the MPSC will allow the cost of the 
project into rates. Undoubtedly, MPC will be responding more to FERC than the MPSC 
on the daily operations of its transmission facilities, leaving the MPSC with oversight of 
only those items listed above and the daily operations of the distribution function.
n. Factors for MPC Succeeding in a Deregulated Market 
Cost and Efficiency
Helping establish a framework for MPC to implement FERC Order No. 888 is Dr. 
James Falvey, Director of Allocated Costs for Montana Power Company. In prefiled 
testimony before the MPSC,*^ Dr. Falvey explains that to implement the FERC 
directive, utility costs must be “unbundled” and assigned to customer classes based on 
cost causation, either embedded or (preferably) marginal cost causation. This is a step 
MFC and the MPSC have been unwilling to take until now, presumably because of the 
political power of the residential (voting) customers, who traditionally have enjoyed 
utility rates lower than the actual cost to serve.
As previously mentioned, traditional MPC rate filings with the MPSC have skewed cost 
signals to MFC’s customer classes, typically with residential customers being 
subsidized by large industrial customers. Rate cases are based on average cost of a pre­
determined annual test period, which is “normalized” to remove non-typical costs. Dr. 
Falvey points out there are two problems with such an approach:
1. The cost signal sent to the consumer is based on an averaging of past fixed and 
incremental costs, not the real cost to serve at a given point in time. According to 
Falvey, “If  cost assignments are not reflective of cost causation, some customers 
may be consuming (not be consuming) services that are not worth (are worth more 
than) the costs those services cause. To the extent that the charge is more reflective 
of cost causation, efficiency improvements will result on an overall societal basis”.
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Going further with the cost causation concept leads to marginal pricing, where 
energy is appropriately priced at the marginal cost of the next kilowatt of power in 
the trading area or market. The most efficient producer will sell power first at the 
lowest price (until all the energy from that producer is used up); the marginal cost of 
the second most efficient producer will establish the price for the next power 
purchaser, and so on until all energy needs are met. The discussion on how the 
buying and selling of power under this concept will be accomplished was included 
in the section “California—The Bellwether State for Deregulation.”
2. MPC spends incredible time capturing information to determine the embedded cost 
causation of each customer class, ultimately determining an appropriate basis for 
allocation of the company’s cost for each customer class. This work is effectively 
undone by a final step -  rate design. Rate design is developed by staff at MFC and is 
the third of three steps performed to develop a rate filing.
After determining the cost of service from the accounting records of the company 
(step 1) the company then segregates these costs into customer classes based on cost 
causation (step 2). Rate design (step 3) takes the allocated costs of each customer 
class and reshuffles them, assigning more costs to be recovered from some classes 
(usually industrial customers) and relieving other classes by the same amount 
(usually residential customers). Rate design doesn’t effect the total dollars requested 
in the rate filing, just the assignment of cost recovery from the various customer 
classes. The motive for the rate design step is generally political. In effect, what was 
attempted in the cost allocation determination step is undone by the rate design.
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Straightening out this cross-subsidization will allow consumers to make their buying 
decisions based correct economic signals, unskewed by traditional rate design Society 
as a whole will benefit by such a structure because consumers will no longer receive 
inappropriate cost signals; producers will be forced to become more efficient in order to 
survive; and resources will be allocated in a way that makes economic sense. The result: 
customer choice for energy consumption linked to energy production will be available 
for the first time, bringing about the competition and efficiency envisioned by FERC 
Chairwoman Moler. Customers will have the opportunity to select their supplier and 
determine supply cost allocations for themselves. No longer will there be endless MPSC 
hearings and contentious debates over the allocation and rate recovery of production 
costs. For the first time, politics will take a back seat to efficient consumption of 
electricity in the state of Montana.
A costless side benefit o f MFC’s restructuring for open access will be the barriers put in 
place that will stop cross-subsidization within the company in the future. MFC’s intent 
is to abandon a vertically-integrated organizational structure. When it does, cross 
subsidization, caused by past rate designing that hid costs from some rate classes while 
overcharging others, will be virtually impossible, because under the new corporate 
structure, discussed more fully in the Company Profile section, the company will be 
operationally unbundled, with an unregulated supply and transmission arm and a 
regulated distribution arm.
Transmission Interties
22
MFC’s success in the new marketplace depends not only on the ability to compete in a 
deregulated generation market, but also on the ability to address transmission intertie 
issues. Transmission interties refer to the physical link(s) between two or more 
transmission systems. Combining all of the transmission systems together that have 
interties make up the transmission grid for that region. There are three major 
transmission grids in the country, which will be discussed in more detail later. MFC is 
linked primarily to the WSCC transmission grid. As Exhibit 4 indicates, MFC is linked 
to the major western U.S. markets via a 500 KV line running from Colstrip to Garrison, 
Montana, leaving the state at Taft. According to an analysis of the California 
competitive energy markets, completed by LCG Consulting for the California Energy 
Commission, MFC provides two generation injection points for the WSCC, one at 
Garrison (listed as Anaconda on the map) and another at Taft.^^
MFC also has access to the Midwestern markets, though with significantly less 
capacity, through a 230-270 KV line that converts with an AC-DC-AC tie at Miles City. 
This line has approximately 200 MW of capacity, which is fully subscribed by the 
Western Area Fower Association (WAFA). According to Bill Fascoe, Vice-Fresident of 
Transmission Services for MFC, to boost the capability of sending power to the 
Midwest, approximately 90 miles of transmission facilities would have to be 
constructed (from Colstrip to Miles City) and significant infrastructure would have to be 
built on both sides of the intertie. It’s most likely this connection will not be pursued 
at this time, because of cost constraints. This effectively means MFC will compete only 
in the WSCC, limiting the opportunities to compete in the Midwest market.
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Market reach to the West becomes a key transmission intertie question for MPC. 
Addressing the distance to substantial markets and what type of penalty MFC would be 
subjected to in order to serve such markets becomes a critical point to competing 
outside Montana. Right now, MFC is effectively blocked from incrementally priced 
competition outside of a close geographic proximity to Montana because of what is 
known as "pancaked transmission pricing.” While selling MFC’s generating assets will 
somewhat relieve the issues surrounding moving power outside of the state, it does not 
completely eliminate the company’s concerns. If pancaked pricing is not eliminated, the 
sale value of MFC’s generating assets will be harmed. Also, assuming MFC will 
continue to be active in energy trading, the elimination of pancaking will be just as 
important to the company as it is to MFC’s competitors.
An example of pancaked transmission pricing is the current prices MFC has to pay to 
deliver power to California, through the only viable system -  the BFA transmission 
network. Under FERC Order No. 888, MFC must charge itself for transmission access 
from Colstrip to the BFA interchange at Garrison, Montana (3 mills, for example), then 
pay BFA 2 mills to transport from Garrison to a second interchange on the BFA system, 
where another 4 mills is charged. Finally, the California system, WEFEX, has put in 
place an access charge to come into the California market. This charge is approximately 
4 mills. These transmission charges total up to 13 mills on a system where BFA sells 
generation incrementally at 3 mills during high run-off years. Some would argue the tail 
is wagging the dog under such a structure.
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To further the argument against pancaking and help explain how electricity actually 
flows through a transmission grid. Jack Berlier, Jr. offers the analogy, ‘Ticture the 
(transmission) grid as a lake All around the lake are customers, drawing out water 
according to their needs. At various points around the same lake are suppliers who add 
water to the lake to keep the level of the lake constant and to maintain supply for 
consumers. When a consumer and supplier agree to buy and sell water, water is added 
to the lake at one end by the supplier and drawn out at the other end by the consumer. 
Berlier goes on to say, “Suppose several water suppliers happen to hold title to 
‘portions’ of the lake basin. If the current electric transmission pricing practices were 
applied to our Make’ analogy, these lake basin owners would keep track of each water 
transaction and charge a fee for passage of water molecules over their portion of the 
lake. Whenever water was added by a supplier to satisfy the withdrawal by a consumer, 
the lake basin owners would consult a map of the lake and draw lines between the 
supplier and the consumer. Any lines that happen to ‘cross’ their parcel of the lake basin 
would signal a right to charge a ‘transportation’ fee. Lines would overlap from multiple 
water transactions, causing disputes among property owners about which lines the 
various transactions actually followed. In reality, of course, the water drawn from one 
end of the lake contained none of the molecules added at the other end.” Finally, Berlier 
states, “A much more equitable solution would be to charge a single price for use of the 
lake basin based on the customer’s volume, which would be distributed among the 
owners o f the lake based on acreage and maintenance c o s t s . T h i s  scenario would
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establish a broad market base for utilities to compete based on an underlying point of 
deregulation: market-driven pricing for generation.
Nationally, according to Berlier, “The development of large markets provides the best 
possible assurance that no single entity, either seller or buyer, can wield market power 
over other participants.” Ideally, to establish an open market, there would be three 
regions in the U.S., defined by the boundaries of the Eastern, Western and Texas 
ERCOT interconnections. This Western region is known as the WSCC, which was 
defined earlier as the Western System Coordinating Council The most significant 
market in the WSCC is California, followed by the growing Northwest market. The 
WSCC links regional resources through an extensive network of transmission lines that 
represent a complex regional system as shown in Exhibit 4. The region encompasses an 
area of nearly 1.8 million square miles of a highly interconnected transmission network 
spanning across the western United States from the Canadian to Mexican borders, 
encompassing the fourteen western states.
Under Berber's scenario, MPC would participate in this region and would be able to 
offer any customer in the region the same transmission rate, regardless of location and 
number of transmission systems crossed to get from the generation source to the 
customer. One way to insure each transmission owner would be compensated for the 
cost of repair and maintenance on their portion of the system would be to have the 
independent system operator (ISO) collect the transmission fees from all users of the 
system. The ISO could then pay the transmission owners based on their ratio of the
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system’s long-run marginal cost to that of the long-run marginal cost for all o f the assets 
under control o f the ISO.
However, the current situation does not allow MPC open access to all markets and does 
not offer a regional transmission rate. For example, MPC currently sells into Los 
Angeles from the non-regulated Colstrip 4 unit. Half o f the generation from Colstrip 4 
is under long-term contract to the city of Los Angeles, with a transmission charge of 
approximately 13 mills. The other half is sold to Puget Sound Power and Light in the 
Seattle area, with a transmission charge of approximately 7 mills. The 6 mill difference 
is due to BP A s  practices of internal pancaking of transmission rates. For example, if an 
energy supplier (MPC) wants to sell to Seattle, one rate applies for the Garrison to 
Seattle leg, usually 2 mills. If MPC wants to sell to California, the Garrison to Seattle 
leg now costs 4 mills, plus the additional 4 mill charge to gain access from WEPEX at 
the California border. This action undoubtedly violates the spirit of FERC Order No. 
888. It would surprise few in the Northwest electric market if FERC took a stand 
against the internal pancaking of BP A transmission rates and the WEPEX '^border 
charge” into California.
While a 3-region concept would facilitate the ability to compete in a very large 
geographic area, it is not the path recommended by William Pascoe, MPC’s Vice 
President of Transmission, nor the path the other utilities in the West seem to be going 
down. While a 3-region open market may be an ultimate goal for open access in the 
U.S., it would be very unwieldy to develop all at once. According to Mr Pascoe, such a 
system needs to be introduced in a smaller scale, such as the one proposed by MPC.
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The MPC proposed system begins with the development of a regional grid. In pre-filed 
testimony for the Restructuring Informational Filing with the MPSC, Mr Pascoe 
indicates MPC supports the formation of a smaller scale regional independent grid 
operator known as IndeGO. IndeGO would control and operate 22,000 miles of high 
voltage transmission lines in an eight state area and would offer one rate across the 
system, effectively eliminating pancaked transmission rates within the region. The eight 
state region includes: Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Oregon 
and northern Nevada. There are 9 investor owned utilities, 10 public utilities and two 
government agencies -  BP A and WAP A, within IndeGO. There will be eleven pricing 
zones, which will vary the transmission charge based primarily on load density. A 
customer in Montana, where there is less load, may pay 4 mills for transmission service 
vs. a customer in Seattle who will get a 2 mill rate. Pricing based on load density 
recognizes that the cost of transmission service is primarily fixed, not variable, and 
therefore appropriately adjusted upward for lower load areas, such as Montana. The 
most disturbing comment by Mr Pascoe came when he estimated it would take up to 
two and a half years to get IndeGO operational, meaning MPC will not be relieved of 
the burden of pancaked pricing anytime in the near future.
IndeGO s partners in the West will be two other systems, the previously mentioned 
California system (WEPEX) and Desert Star, which is just now forming. Desert Star 
includes the Arizona, New Mexico and southern Nevada markets.
While not as far-reaching as Berlier’s concept or the California analysis completed by 
LCG Consulting, the IndeGO plan effectively opens up a pgional area to real
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competition and is consistent with the intent of FERC Order No. 889 in that 
transmission regions would be governed by ISOs, insuring open, non-discriminatory 
transmission service under a FERC tariff. In addition, Pascoe believes that IndeGO will 
improve reliability o f delivery service both within each company and regionally, 
through the synergies created by being part o f a regional transmission system. Pascoe 
also mentions that the separation of transmission and wholesale power purchase 
functions will help eliminate the split focus of the former transmission employee. 
Previously, a transmission employee had responsibility for both wholesale power 
transactions as well as the operation of the transmission system. The attention required 
to execute wholesale power purchases typically would draw the employee away from 
his or her system operational responsibilities.
Finally, the ability o f competitors to come into MPC’s market territory and be able to 
sell in an economically rational manner will assure MPC’s customers of competitively 
priced generation. However, if transmission pancaking continues, these same MPC 
customers would be unable to receive competitively priced electricity from outside the 
state.
Employee Skills
Deregulation will not only require efficient production of electricity and transmission 
pricing that will truly establish a broad market base in which to compete; it will require 
a fundamental change in the required skills of company employees and management.
In the past, MPC employee and management ability focused primarily on two 
disciplines: engineering and accounting. The engineers built the regulated assets and the
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accountants kept track of the costs to be reported to the MPSC. High employee 
performance within the utility industry use to mean insuring the lights came on reliably, 
customer calls were answered promptly (something that can be used for brand equity if 
in fact the company is “good” to its customers), shareholders received a fair and stable 
rate o f return on their investment, and the company was run in an acceptable manner 
according to the state public service commission. Targeted improvements for the next 
year were typically based on some improvement relative to current standard, such as a 
10% reduction in O&M costs. Employees wrote the justification for capital projects 
with little emphasis on economics or business reasoning, instead focusing on insuring a 
reliable and redundant (safe) system. There was little thought given to competitors 
outside the system, other than to estimate how much off-system sales might be possible 
in the coming year, with a goal of buffering the regulatory requirement needed from 
traditional ratepayers. These were the traits of effective employees and management.
But for the competitive future, whether the utility adopts an offensive or defensive 
strategy, a new set of performance standards will be required. Emerging non-regulated 
competitors, unencumbered by the entitlement culture and the comparatively limited 
marketing and business skills o f today’s utility company workforce, will redefine the 
employee traits o f a successful energy company.
According to an article entitled “Building a Winning Electric Utility Organization,” 
written by Farha, Keough and Silverman, “Tomorrow’s successful energy company 
employee will have superior marketing, risk management, product development, and 
alliance management skills, which few utilities have.” The authors continue, “...most
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Utilities have a weak organizational starting point relative to emerging competitors. And 
the approaches they typically use to manage organizational change, such as company- 
wide quality management or reengineering efforts, are unlikely to drive the type of 
change needed.”*̂  The emerging competitors referred to by the authors are not other 
traditional utilities. They are non-utility generators (NUGs), independent power 
producers (IPPs), investment banks, even arbitrators and natural gas marketers. 
Emerging competitors will be companies which are already into successful, competitive 
businesses.
One company displaying an understanding of the new, competitive world is UtiliCorp 
United of Kansas City, Missouri. In May 1995, UtiliCorp began marketing its retail 
products and services under the EnergyOne brand. Since then, the utility has announced 
several agreements as the sole supplier of natural gas to Service Merchandise Corp. and 
the gas supplier to the 13,000-member Asian-American Hotel Association. It will be the 
preferred supplier of electricity to both organizations once retail delivery is permitted. 
UtiliCorp also has signed a contract to supply EnergyOne billing services to 2,200 
branches of Bank of America. The employees who put these deals together did not 
come from traditional utility backgrounds. They understood and embraced marketing 
concepts that are foreign to most utility employees right now.
Aggregators and brokers outside the utility industry already are changing the market 
with their fresh insights, aggressive business tactics and expertise in mass marketing. In 
generation, for example, the management of an IPP will better understand the level of 
performance required to keep a formally-regulating generating plant competitive in the
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marketplace. Previously, management of the plant was focused on reliability, not 
competitiveness in the marketplace. Ratepayers were picking up the tab, so the safety 
net of regulation allowed management to run the facility with less concern for 
efficiency than the managers of a comparable IPP. In addition, utilities with ineffective 
marketing strategies will lose their most profitable customers to such non-utility 
competitors, leaving lower-margin key accounts and a dwindling base of mass accounts 
once competition reaches the retail sector.
What will be needed at MPC is radical and prompt change to address both the changing 
environment and needed employee skills. In their article, “Winning in Electricity 
Generation,” authors Lewis Hashimoto, Paul Jansen and Gerrit van Geyn point to the 
winners in year 2005 as those who “early on developed strategies that simultaneously 
recovered existing generation investments while restructuring their asset portfolios and 
repositioning their plants to compete in the new market. Losers will have spent the time 
mired in indecision, their strategies ultimately forced upon them by regulators or 
competitors.” ^̂  MPC has struggled for the last two years with the question of how to 
approach the stranded cost recovery issue, keeping management focus diverted from 
how to effectively develop new employee skills and set a strategy in motion. By making 
the decision to sell its generating assets, the company can now gain a focus on how to 
move forward with deregulation.
What is needed to implement an effective aggressive strategy are employees who are 
able to create significant improvements in operating performance. Targeting some 
“incremental” reduction in last year’s operating costs will not net the changes needed to
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compete in the deregulated environment, especially against emerging competitors who 
have never operated under regulation.
Farha notes that three areas need the attention of utility management:
•  Setting the right performcmce aspirations for employees. Ideally, utility 
companies should set their performance standards at the same level as 
today’s top companies in other industries. Performance standards will need 
to be higher than ever before, since many of the new entrants in the energy 
business are companies who have been successful in a competitive 
environment: IPPs, investment banks, natural gas marketers and arbitrage 
opportunists.
• Knowing the company's starting point. Assessing the ability of a company to 
change and knowing where the company needs to begin are critical for the 
management team of today’s electric utility. Having strategic clarity and 
vision, performance goals that stretch the organization, involved employees, 
aggressively managed business and production processes, exploitable 
information technology and a learning environment that increases employee 
effectiveness are all key components of an effective strategy that cannot be 
accomplished unless an organization knows its starting point
• Building a skill-hased and performance-focused organization. This must 
first be done by ensuring the CEO communicates the vision and the strategy 
behind the vision, so that employees understand the direction and how they 
can contribute. Next, the company should hire nontraditional senior
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managers with skills that were not considered important before, like deal 
structuring and marketing. If a current manager has the right intrinsic skills, 
but no real experience utilizing such skills for the utility, the CEO must 
make it a priority to nurture these skills in that manager. Finally, employees 
and managers must be accountable for the success or failure of the company. 
Expectations must be met and everyone, including the CEO, must walk the 
talk Employees need to be rewarded for thinking innovatively, working in a 
team setting, and focusing on relationship building with external partners, 
customers and suppliers.
The new management skills needed to run a successful MPC will not come overnight. 
One of the biggest challenges will be for employees, especially middle management, to 
break out of the daily routine of doing things the same old way. Even though MFC 
employees may attend seminars or be part of in-house training sessions on how to 
prepare for competition, they will find it very difficult to actually come back to work 
and change their daily routine. The pressures of their jobs and their daily workload will 
push the good intentions aside. According to Douglas K. Smith, author of ‘Take Charge 
of Change - Ten Principles for Managing People and Performance,” it’s not an issue of 
active resistance to change. Rather, roughly 80 percent of employees facing change are 
neither ready for it nor determined to resist it. They just don’t know what to do or what 
is expected of them.*^ They also don’t have, or believe they don’t have, the “time” to 
change. If senior managers do not set an example for employees to follow, the 
confusion employees feel will turn to resistance
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Smith offers the example of Tandem Computers. In 1993, Tandem needed to make 
strategic changes in its organization that required the full support of its sales staff A 
key change would require a team selling approach, where the salesperson teamed up 
with software and application employees. The purpose was to offer total business 
solutions, rather than just selling hardware. So off to a seminar the sales staff went, 
creating “from/to” charts that identified the working relationships, skills and behaviors 
needed in the new organization. Upon leaving the seminar, everyone was very excited 
about what they had learned. But back at their desks, the doubts settled in and the daily 
pressures forced the seminar charts and ideas into desk drawers. According to Smith, 
‘The employees were not resisting the change, they just felt reluctant about it and they 
didn’t have enough reasons to do things differently. Good ideas - and strategies that can 
save the company - go nowhere when people don’t know how to shift from their 
existing daily routine to the new one on the chart.” MPC runs this risk for at least four 
reasons:
1. Some employees (however irrationally) hold company management 
responsible for the change to competition and blame the company for 
destabilizing their work environment.
2. With the significant downsizing that has occurred in the past year, many 
employees across the company are witnessing involuntary separations for 
the first time. The employees that survived the dovmsizing (for the time 
being) are disgruntled and untrusting of management.
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3. Everyone believes they are very busy, whether the product of their efforts is 
important or not to a competitive company. They are caught in the inertia of 
80+ years of utility mindset.
4. Many employees believe they must continue with business as usual, because 
competition is something that won’t really effect the company for 3-5 years. 
So on one hand, they resent management for changing their environment 
and bringing on competition; but on the other, they really don’t believe 
competition is going to directly effect them in the foreseeable future.
A common conversation on the streets of Butte, Montana (MPC’s headquarters) is to 
claim no knowledge about where MFC is headed and to express serious doubts about 
the safety of anyone’s job or the company’s future. This is not an environment where 
employees are plugged into the company’s direction and are actively helping to 
establish a healthy, highly competitive energy company.
Branding Utility Products
Besides the employee issues and skills discussed above, one of the biggest changes for 
today’s utilities will be the need to sell themselves to their customers. Utilities, by 
tradition, have not had to concern themselves with issues such as customer perception, 
loyalty, or value of the product in the consumer’s eyes. The concern has traditionally 
been one of reliability, as defined and enforced by the state PSC. While proven 
reliability can be a positive branding point, utilities also must learn how to develop 
additional branding strategies that will build value with the customer. One of the more 
important strategies is building customer loyalty. According to David Aaker, author of
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“The Value of Brand Equity,” companies should care a lot about their customer brand 
loyalty. The value of such loyalty comes from both a predictable sales stream and 
administrative and marketing cost reductions. It costs significantly less to keep an 
existing customer than it does to attract a new one.̂ ®
For many utilities, this will be the first time considering such things as customer loyalty, 
or the development of branding strategies. And it will be a critical time to develop a 
sustainable competitive advantage that competes on factors other than price. As Tom 
Peters states, “In an increasingly crowded marketplace, fools will compete on price. 
Winners will find a way to create lasting value in the customer’s mind.” ‘̂ This creates a 
real challenge for utility management, since their product (electrons) is difficult to 
differentiate and the tradition has been to focus on price.
But through difficulty comes creativity, as shown by several utilities in their recent 
marketing campaigns. First, PG&E has developed the Clean Choice brand, being 
marketed as “green electricity” in California. Clean Choice offers three different options 
of renewable power sources: 100%, 50% and 20% power from solar, wind, geothermal, 
biomass and small hydro sources, with the remainder of the 50% or 80% coming from 
hydro power. None of the Clean Choice products include power from coal, oil or other 
fossil fuel, nuclear, wood waste from old growth forests, tire-burning, or solid 
municipal waste sources. In addition, a portion of the 100% and 50% mixes includes 
energy from “new renewable” sources -  wind, solar, geothermal and other renewable 
energy plants that will be built in the future, thereby helping to expand the development 
of environmentally-friendly energy. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
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has reinforced PG&E’s efforts by including these products on its Environmentally 
Preferred Product list.
Second, Edison International, another California-based company, has adopted a strategy 
that also focuses on environmental friendliness through product development. In a 
recently launched advertising campaign, customers in the Los Angeles area can save up 
to $150 on a new electric mulching lawnmower that “mows down pollution” through a 
mower trade-in event. Customers are encouraged to turn in their old polluting gasoline 
mowers and purchase a new electric mulching mower, which helps reduce gasoline 
mower air emissions, gasoline storage, oil changes, and noise pollution. In addition, the 
campaign points out that an electric mulching mower chops the nutrient-rich trimmings 
into fertilizing mulch, which results in a healthier lawn, less need for watering and no 
lawn waste to bag and contribute to the landfill.
Finally, many utilities across the U.S., such as the Kansas City-based UtiliCorp 
mentioned earlier, have hired executives from marketing firms and have gone about 
differentiating their product by developing a brand name. By developing the EnergyOne 
brand, under which retail products and services are marketed, UtiliCorp has 
differentiated itself as an energy aggregator; it offers to put individual packages 
together for its customers based on their particular needs and service requirements. 
None of these campaigns focus on price or the generic product — electricity. They focus 
on new products or services and on differentiating based on the source of the electricity.
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Name or brand awareness is also key to successfully branding a company or product. 
The hometown utility usually will have an advantage in this area, since the regulated 
customer of yesterday is most likely familiar only with the existing utility. Again 
assuming the company has done a good job with reliability and customer service, the 
customer usually will have good feelings about the product and level of service. This 
gives the local utility two key advantages: the perception of brand quality, via the 
expectation of reliability, and name awareness.
To be perceived as reliable attaches quality to the product and can be the beginning of 
positive branding. The company will be able to identify its reliability with its brand, 
providing a powerful marketing tool to use against competitors. The customer will 
develop a brand loyalty and have no desire or motivation to talk to other energy 
providers. This will be an important point for MPC after deregulation, especially with 
residential customers. It is accepted that MFC has been a reliable utility, a good 
corporate citizen and one of the largest employers in the state of Montana. Now the 
company must capitalize on this reputation through an effective branding campaign. 
Not only will such a campaign cement the company’s relationship with its customers, it 
will show the shareholders that the company has a strong company image and an 
articulated strategy to address competition. For the shareholder, focusing on short-term 
financial goals will not be enough to insure the maximization of wealth in the future. 
MPC’s brand image will become equally as important.
New Technologies
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To help accomplish the move to a competitive environment in which energy is traded 
on a level playing field, new technologies are called upon to fulfill FERC’s requirement 
of a real time, electronic information network.
This system is known to MPC as OASIS (Open Access Same-time Information 
System). The purpose of OASIS (or whatever electronic bulletin board a utility is using) 
is to provide a medium for the timely distribution of information on the availability and 
pricing of transmission services in a manner that does not create an advantage for the 
utility operating the OASIS To comply with this requirement and insure non- 
discriminatory access to its transmission system for all wholesale market participants, 
MFC will lease space on the BFA OASIS and file written standards of conduct (with 
FERC) to govern its use of the OASIS MFC began posting information on BFA’s 
OASIS on January 3, 1997.
There is concern that third parties will not receive all pertinent information 
simultaneously with the OASIS utility. To ease this concern, FERC has ordered that all 
real-time information concerning transmission networks be recorded and placed in 
archives, available for audit if a third party files a complaint. FERC indeed may go 
further with the oversight of electronic bulletin board systems and decide not to wait for 
complaints, but rather establish routine audits.
A side benefit of the competition spurred by FERC Order No. 888 will be technical 
innovation in the monitoring of power consumption. Advances that will be needed by 
customers who have a power supply choice will be time-of-use meters and analytical 
monitors. Time-of-use meters will become critical in tracking load profiling and
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supplier/consumer energy balancing and billing. Today, these meters are cost 
prohibitive to the average residential customer.
According to MPC’s Informational Filing exhibit “ ‘Load Profiling’ a Possible Electric 
Utility Restructuring Tool,” the problem today comes from the existing KWh/KW 
meters that only provide cumulative billing information for a specified period of time, 
usually 30 days. Currently, there is no cost-effective way to find out what a customer’s 
power supply needs are in any given hour or day. So an alternative power supplier may 
be oversupplying or undersupplying MPC’s system throughout the billing month, 
causing MPC to “balance” the system needs with supply on a hourly and daily basis. 
Since power is sold by the hour and day, there is potential for a significant cost to MPC 
if the alternative power supplier is shorting the system during a peak (high priced) 
period Until technology is capable of placing cost-effective time-of-use meters in 
residential homes, where metering data can be matched with the customer’s alternative 
power supplier on an hour-by-hour or day-by-day basis, the local utility company will 
need to be compensated for balancing demand with supply on the system. The utility 
will “balance” the system by either producing more electricity from its own generation, 
or purchasing power off the transmission grid, via the independent system operator. 
Time-of-use meters also will allow greater flexibility in rate setting in on- and off-peak 
periods. With technology that can track usage down to the hour, power suppliers will be 
able to offer power rates that change on a hourly, daily, or monthly basis. If customers 
are incented to conserve power during high demand periods and conversely shift power
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usage to off-peak periods, higher load factors will result in more efficient usage of the 
power supply systems in the United States.
Analytical monitors will provide the energy supplier with downloaded data from the 
meter, which can then be combined and analyzed with thousands of other customer load 
profiles. Utilities of tomorrow will need to be much more knowledgeable about the 
usage patterns and supply information of their customers.
In reality, because purchasing time-of-use meters will be the customer’s (or a courting 
energy supplier’s) responsibility and the cost will be prohibitive until technology 
catches up, customers will be charged for their usage based on a typical load profile for 
that customer class. For example, residential customers typically have peak usage 
during the early morning hours and in the early evening, causing the energy supplier to 
standby ready to serve at these peak times. Consumption falls off for the rest of the day, 
creating a low load factor (defined as the percentage of plant capacity being used at any 
given time). Low load factors mean inefficient use of the resource. Customers in this 
group will be charged a higher peak-time usage fee, regardless of their individual 
energy conservation practices Therefore, customers who conserve will have an 
incentive to upgrade their meter and receive cheaper rates. Thus, the energy supplier 
gains a better load factor and society benefits from the more efficient use of generating 
resources.
Regulatory Treatments
Prior to MPC’s decision to offer its generating assets for sale, the company would have 
considered at length the possible reactions of the MPSC to MPC’s Informational Filing.
42
This may have, in fact, been one of the driving forces in deciding to sell the generating 
assets of the company. Given past MPSC actions, the company would have good reason 
to expect that a request to cover transition costs over a phase-in period, as the 
Informational Filing was seeking, would have been rejected.
In addition, it was predictable that the MCC would resist any action that would disfavor 
residential customers in the state. It is not known if the MCC believes open competition 
will benefit the average residential customer. But what can be predicted is resistance, by 
the MCC, to any attempt to shift costs to the residential class, even if the cost shifting is 
simply correcting prior flawed rate design signals.
If an official filing had taken place, as structured in the Informational Filing, the 
company’s transition plan would have accomplished at least two significant items for 
MPC:
• It would have removed MPSC regulatory oversight of MPC’s generating assets 
and launched the company into the competitive energy arena for all the power 
that could be produced over and above the native load requirements.
It would have guaranteed the company would recover the majority of its 
stranded costs (otherwise uncollectable in a competitive marketplace, i.e. 
transition costs) from its captive ratepayers. This significantly reduced the 
required market price for incremental sales in the wholesale marketplace. If 
MPC could sell at the incremental cost of its thermal or hydro units and flow 
the profits to shareholders (rather than reducing the ratepayers revenue 
requirement, as is the current case), the company would become stronger
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financially and more likely to survive under full competition. Currently, 
wholesale power sales reduce the revenue required from traditional 
ratepayers by approximately $58 million/year.^^ Of this amount, $41 million 
is earned from out-of-state sales 
The most recent action by MPC, offering its generating assets for sale, effectively limits 
the need for regulatory oversight of generating costs to simply reviewing a market- 
based contract for power, either from the unregulated Supply Division or outside third 
parties. This is assuming, as mentioned earlier, the sale takes place and MPC and the 
MPSC have reached agreement on how much of the sale proceeds will be returned to 
the ratepayers and how much will stay with the company and shareholders.
Financial Strength
As already discussed, the future success of a utility in the deregulated world will depend 
on many factors. The company’s ability to control cost and develop efficiencies, 
utilizing new technologies; transmission interties to desirable markets; the skills of its 
employees and regulatory treatment from the local PSC will all factor into the success 
or failure o f tomorrow’s energy companies. Another factor to consider is the financial 
strength of the company. How much of the asset base is tied up in generating assets that 
are now going to have to compete in an open marketplace? If the company is a low-cost 
producer, financial strength will go up However, many utilities will be competing 
against aggressive, independent power producers for the first time and may not in fact 
be the low-cost producer. In this case, financial strength will be harmed. Also, if the 
utility in the recent past underwent major generation construction projects, the financial
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Strength of the company could be seriously harmed by deregulation, since the assets 
would most likely be considered impaired and of less value to the financial world. In 
addition, utilities that have financed such projects with debt will feel an additional 
negative effect from those who value the company in the marketplace, since the bond 
ratings will undoubtedly slip.
Finally, efficiencies in generation will in large part come from economies of scale, as 
they did from airline, natural gas and telecommunication deregulation. Relatively small 
utility companies, such as MPC, will not be able to compete effectively with larger 
scale operations, especially those closer to large markets. The desire to merge and grow, 
gain economies of scale, develop resource balancing between seasonal loads and 
capitalize on large, diverse customer bases will drive many utilities to merge or acquire 
other companies that can fulfill the new strategic directions being driven by 
competition.
Ability to stay the same, merge with or acquire other energy companies
Because of the new interest in consolidation in order to survive in the deregulated 
world, FERC has given significant attention to the questions surrounding utility 
mergers, as well as the debate concerning functional and operational “disaggregation.” 
Functional disaggregation occurs with the separation of generation, transmission, and 
distribution services into individual business units under the same corporate ownership. 
Operational disaggregation takes the separation one step further, with the corporate 
divestiture of generation, transmission, and distribution into separate corporate entities. 
Disaggregation
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As utilities realign for competition, the concerns raised by FERC and state PUCs cover 
a wide spectrum of issues. At the core is whether or not utilities should be forced into 
operational disaggregation. On either end of the spectrum are two people overseeing the 
transition, FERC Commissioner Vickey A. Bailey and Oregon PUC Chairwoman Joan 
H. Smith.
According to an article written by Steven M. Fetter, FERC Commissioner Vickey A. 
Bailey believes that for a competitive market to thrive, it must operate as free from 
government interference as possible. The limited role for government she would allow 
tracks FERC’s activity in its Open Access Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), 
namely the setting of rules to ensure;
• Open access on transmission lines
•  A sufficient number of generation competitors
• That buyers and sellers are not allowed to gain advantage from owning
both generation and transmission
Commissioner Bailey suggests that, while divestiture is not necessary to comply with 
FERC’s proposed rules, a corporation might choose to do so as the path of least 
resistance. Bailey’s FERC colleagues, commissioners Massey and Hoecker, echo a 
willingness to see if functional disaggregation is sufficient to achieve comparability, or 
fair use of the transmission grid.’̂
On the other end of the spectrum is Oregon PUC Chairwomen Joan H. Smith. She 
believes operational disaggregation is mandatory to insure a competitive environment. 
According to Fetter, Smith maintains that without divestiture, 'there is a continued need
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for regulatory oversight to prevent self-dealing abuses.” By demanding divestiture, the 
stage is set for competitiveness with little regulatory intervention. The need for 
regulators at either the state or federal level would be minimized and the need of the 
public to have competitively priced energy would be met by the marketplace rather than 
by regulation.
Other points to consider are:
• Whether forcing o f companies to divest their assets can stand the test o f
demonstrable benefits to both wholesale and retail customers. Raising 
concerns over this issue is Chairwomen Susan F. Clark - Florida Public 
Service Commission. She questions the wisdom of forcing the separation of 
generation and transmission facilities, since the electric industry has 
historically planned and optimized its generation and transmission facilities 
as one unit, with instantaneous communication between the system 
dispatcher and his/her transmission counterpart, to insure system reliability 
and economics. Redundancy of facilities and staff becomes a concern, as 
well as the state’s ability to meet the needs of its retail customers when the 
jurisdiction over two of the three components (generation and transmission) 
has significantly diminished. According to Clark, ‘TJnlike the natural gas 
industry, which was disaggregated by the FERC, market-priced and 
embedded-cost electric generation and transmission facilities cannot be 
cleanly separated into FERC-regulated wholesale facilities and state- 
regulated retail facilities. We are concerned that retail ratepayers will be
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required to pay for much of the cost of this competitive reform, but that 
wholesale market participants will reap much of the b e n e f i t .” ^? Clark is 
concerned that state regulators, who are now charged with establishing fair 
and nondiscriminatory retail electric rates from investor-owed utilities, will 
lose control over the cost and revenue structure of generation and 
transmission facilities.
Also, the Florida PSC, (like Montana) has been the sole forum for 
determining the need for major power plants and transmission facilities. 
Would this responsibility be shifted to the federal level? If so, how are the 
needs and concerns of the state’s residents represented? It is possible that the 
federal government would protect the wholesale power market at the cost of 
the state’s retail customers and residents?
•  I f  a stand-alone generation company can attract the necessary capital to 
build new production facilities. Or, as suggested by Ohio’s PUC Chairman 
Craig A. Glazer, “is the industry structure a natural monopoly where only a 
few ‘megaplayers’ will be able to attract the capital needed to build new 
plants?” '̂*
• I f  system reliability will be compromised by the potential breakup of 
corporations. Glazer cautions that while the theory of disaggregation makes 
sense from an economic and perhaps societal view, it may not make sense 
from an engineering point of view. He states that we should look back and 
remember why the electric utility industry was structured as a vertically
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integrated system. “Electrons listen the laws of physics and not the laws of 
any governing body. The system was built as an integrated one, since this 
was the most efficient means, from an engineering point of view, to deliver 
these vital electrons to customers distant from the power plants that generate 
them.” Glazer poses the question, “Can the system operate fully 
disaggregated where no single entity has operational control over the vital 
parts o f the system?”^
This raises a follow-up question: does the current effort to make the market 
more efficient cause the physical operation of the production and 
transmission facilities to become less efficient? If so, what is the net gain to 
society? State and federal regulators need to consider these critical questions 
when setting the direction for electric industry deregulation.
MPC has restructured the corporation to accomplish functional disaggregation, 
establishing two divisions — Energy Supply Division and Energy and Communication 
Services Division, along with realigning transmission services into the Energy and 
Communication Services Division. According the Mr. Pascoe, ‘Tunctional unbundling 
is apparent in MPC’s new organizational structure. Prior to this reorganization, MPC 
generation and transmission (G&T) activities were combined in a single business unit. 
Now generation is part of MPC’s Energy Supply Division and transmission is part of 
MPC’s Energy and Communications Services Division. In addition, we have divided 
our formerly integrated control center activities to comply with the functional 
unbundling concept. Staff at our Systems Operations Control Center (SOCC), which is
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part o f the Energy and Communications Services Division, are now responsible for 
operating the transmission system and for maintaining overall system reliability. Former 
SOCC staff responsible for economic dispatch of MPC’s generating plants and for 
wholesale power transactions are now part of the Energy Supply Division and have 
been relocated to a ‘trading floor’ environment in another MFC facility.
Mergers
While a great deal o f attention has been given to whether or not corporations should be 
forced to disaggregate, equal regulatory attention has been paid to questions raised by 
potential mergers in this new competitive environment FERC Commissioner Massey 
states “a merger which is truly ‘consistent with the public interest’ must not have a 
deleterious effect on competition.”^̂  He indicates that FERC and state regulators should 
be cautious in approving mergers that allow a concentration of generation assets, while 
favoring mergers that create regional transmission grids. There has been little merger 
activity so far to support the idea that companies are actively pursuing mergers for the 
purpose of developing regional transmission grids, or avoiding mergers that concentrate 
generating assets.
In the past, mergers were analyzed by regulators based on each merger’s impact on 
costs. Because rates were cost-based, cost savings due to the merger were the key 
determining factor in approving the merger. To the extent there were cost savings, these 
savings could be passed on to consumers through rate reductions. Moving to a 
competitive environment where rates will be set by the supply and demand of the 
market changes the focus of regulators. Now, mergers can have an undesirable result.
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from a societal view, if the generation function is inappropriately concentrated, thus 
restricting competition. Future evaluations of mergers will need to be based upon 
thorough analysis of the impact the merger will have on market power and competition. 
From the company’s viewpoint, mergers can be difficult and disadvantageous, given 
many conflicting (and sometimes competing) regulatory views, from FERC vs. state 
jurisdiction to varying state regulatory policies and philosophies.
An example of an attempted utility merger that ultimately was abandoned because of 
regulatory confusion is the Washington Water Power (WWP) of Washington and Sierra 
Pacific Resources of Nevada merger proposed on June 27, 1994. The merger was 
abandoned in June 1996.
In WWP’s July 8, 1996 SEC 8-K filing, the company gave the following explanation 
for canceling the merger:
“On June 28, 1996, the Board of Directors of The Washington Water Power 
Company (“Company”) terminated the Agreement and Plan of Reorganization 
and Merger, dated as of June 27, 1994 (the "Merger Agreement"), by and among 
the Company, Sierra Pacific Resources, a Nevada corporation ("SPR"), Sierra 
Pacific Power Company, a Nevada corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of SPR ("SPPC") and Altus Corporation, a Nevada corporation and a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of the Company ("Altus"), which would have provided for the 
merger of the Company, SPR and SPPC with and into Altus. The Board of 
directors noted the significant disparity in views among the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (the "FERC"), as reflected in the position of its Staff,
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and the state regulatory commissions having primary jurisdiction over the 
companies. The FERC was concerned with wholesale markets at the national 
level Each state commission, on the other hand, was concerned with the 
interests of retail customers in its particular jurisdiction. The Board concluded 
that there was little chance of obtaining approval of the proposed merger from 
each of the regulatory commissions having jurisdiction, on terms consistent with 
the regulatory principles adopted by the companies and satisfactory to each 
other commission.
In addition, the Board concluded that even if the proposed merger were 
consummated, Altus would be subject to significant continuing risk of 
inconsistent regulation, with the stockholders of Altus bearing the financial 
consequences of such inconsistency.”^̂
While mergers will undoubtedly occur, as deregulation goes forward and markets 
become less defined by geography and state boundaries, the concerns of regulators 
about unhealthy concentration of generating assets, and the concerns of company’s 
about inconsistent treatment from multiple jurisdictions, will need to be resolved to the 
satisfaction of all parties.
m. IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON MFC 
The New World of Competition
In order to contemplate the effects of deregulation on MPC, there needs to be an 
assessment of how the company has responded to competition up until this point. MPC 
has not seen itself as a leader in setting the off-system pricing for the region, rather a 
taker of available market price. Unfortunately, in normal or high run-off years, the 
price-setter in the Northwest has been the BP A, which has a very small incremental cost 
to produce from its hydro facilities, plus a tax free status as a governmental agency. In 
addition, BPA owns a large portion of the 500 KV transmission system between 
Montana and major West Coast markets, with rights to set transmission prices that 
could perhaps discriminate against their competitors (in the world before deregulation). 
With these advantages, the BPA has been able to suppress wholesale power rates in the 
Northwest for many years, effectively dominating the marketplace to the exclusion of 
all others. This has left MPC with little financial incentive to offer its excess generation 
into the marketplace.
With deregulation, MPC will have the first real opportunity to compete in a marketplace 
where eventually there will be numerous competitors and relative ease of entry. As 
pointed out by Dr. Shephard in his pre-filed testimony before the MPSC, “competition 
is usually not fully effective when there is dominance by one firm or a tight oligopoly 
with only two or three firms holding nearly all the market. The deregulated market will 
usually need to evolve past these types so as to contain numerous strong competitors
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Deregulation will open this door for MPC, and for those competitors that will seek 
MPC’s customers, without the market-surpressing influence of BPA.
As previously mentioned, MPC has in the past penalized its large industrial customers, 
by increasing rates above the true cost of service, so these customers could subsidize 
rates charged to the residential class. With the implementation of FERC Order No. 888, 
MPC’s large industrial customers will be able to shop for the most competitive energy 
supplier. And these new energy suppliers are waiting in the wings to serve in an open 
marketplace that is dictated by price rather than legislation and monopoly power.
The new world of competition for MPC will first result in these large industrial 
customers, which make up approximately one-half of the utility’s regulated revenue 
stream, being able to seek new power suppliers. With this high of an exposure to load 
loss, MPC must either take quick action to correct the overcharge of rates to the large 
industrial class, or embrace deregulation and attempt to replace lost revenue with new 
opportunities presented by deregulation. Either way, MPC’s large industrial customers 
will be the first to experience deregulation, followed by commercial customers and then 
finally residential customers. A schedule of how MPC proposes to transition to a 
competitive environment is presented in the next section.
If MPC is not successful in restructuring the company to immediately address the 
effects of deregulation, the company stands to lose one of its largest revenue classes and 
will not be positioned to take advantage of the opportunities brought on by open 
competition.
Changes in the Montana Regulatory and Legislative Environment
54
To bring about FERC mandate to open transmission systems nationwide, states must 
take action to undo the regulated environment. To this end, on Tuesday, April 15, 1997, 
the Montana legislature passed into law the Electric Restructuring and Customer Choice 
law, authorizing the restructuring of the state’s electric utility industry. Montana is the 
second western state, behind California, to pass legislation that will put into effect 
deregulation at the state level.
The focus of the Montana legislation includes:
•  calling for customer choice of supplier as soon as July 1, 1998, but no later 
than July 1, 2002
• a two-year rate freeze on customer rates
• an additional two-year rate freeze on the energy component of bills for 
residential and commercial customers
• provisions for recovery of utilities’ stranded costs
According to the law, actual recovery of the stranded costs a utility may incur will be 
determined by the MPSC after a review of the stranded costs and the utility’s efforts to 
mitigate such costs. As previously mentioned, MFC has changed direction and will not 
be seeking the recovery of stranded costs. Rather, the company has chosen to sell its 
generating assets on the open market, effectively eliminating stranded generating costs, 
which was the bulk of MPC’s stranded cost recovery request. This change has 
undoubtedly simplified the cost recovery issue for MPC and the State.
To begin deregulation, MPC filed a transition plan with the MPSC on July 2, 1997. 
MPC’s plan calls for customer choice to be available to the company’s 75-100 largest
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customers by July 1, 1998 (these customers consume approximately 40 percent of the 
company’s electricity). The next layer allowed choice would be approximately 10% of 
the residential and small commercial customers, who could seek alternative suppliers by 
July, 2000. Half of the remaining customers would be allowed to exit MPC’s generation 
by July, 2001, with the remaining customers going to full choice by July, 2002. In the 
near term, the company proposes to establish pilot programs to help develop the 
administrative functions related to choice.
In addition to the schedule for transition, other items under consideration by the MPSC 
include: establishing a cost-based contract between MPC’s Supply (unregulated) and 
Energy Services (regulated) Divisions for customers who do not have a viable choice 
during the transition period; establishment of a USBC, earlier defined as a Universal 
System Benefit Charge, to provide for conservation research and low-income 
assistance; potential changes in MPC’s organizational structure; and standards of 
conduct for the utility in a competitive environment.
With these actions of the Montana legislature and MPSC, Montana is headed down the 
path of becoming an early entrant into the new competitive marketplace of the WSCC. 
Company Profile
Company Establishment and Structure
MPC came into existence 1912, beginning as a small regional electric company. From 
the original electric business, supported primarily by hydro operations, Montana Power 
expanded into natural gas service in 1931, and in 1951 became the first major utility in 
the United States to import natural gas from Canada. As possible hydroelectric sites
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became more scarce, Montana Power acquired coal reserves in eastern Montana in 
1959, and began its surface mining ventures in 1968, expanding to Texas lignite fields 
in 1985. The non-utility ventures also included oil and natural gas businesses. 
Telecommunications - required to link one of the nation's most wide-spread electric 
transmission operations - became a commercial venture in 1984. In 1988, the company 
began its independent power operation to manage long-term contracts for the non-utility 
sale of electricity from Colstrip Unit 4, and to invest in non-utility generating plants.
The following provides a description of the major components o f MPC’s operations. 
Utility Electric Operations
MPC’s Utility Electric System extends through the western two-thirds of Montana. 
Generating capability is provided by four coal-fired thermal generation units, with total 
net capability available to the Utility o f 683,000 kW, and 12 hydroelectric projects and 
one storage dam, with total net median water capability of 474,400 kW. The thermal 
units are
(1) Colstrip Unit 3, which has a net capability of 740,000 kW, of which the 
Company owns 222,000 kW;
(2) Colstrip Units 1 and 2, with a combined net capability of 614,000 kW, of 
which the Utility owns 307,000 kW, and;
(3) the wholly-owned 154,000 kW Corette Plant. Western Energy, a subsidiary 
of MPC, supplies all of the Colstrip coal requirements under long-term 
contracts. The Corette Plant is supplied under a short-term contract from a non- 
MPC Wyoming mine. Reliability o f service is enhanced by the location of
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hydroelectric generation on two separate watersheds with different precipitation
characteristics and by various sources of thermal generation.
In addition to the Utility's hydroelectric and thermal resources, it currently receives 
electricity through 18 contracts totaling 353,300 kW of firm winter peak capacity. 
These contracts vary in type, size, seller and ending dates. Again, the generating plants 
at Colstrip, plus the hydroelectric operations currently are for sale.
At December 31, 1997, the Utility owned and operated 6,889 miles of transmission 
lines and 15,639 miles of distribution lines. Transmission lines are high voltage lines 
that move power across a system (i.e. from Colstrip to various substations on the MPC 
system, or to BPA’s transmission system) while distribution lines deliver low voltage 
power to the ultimate end user (i.e. from the substation to the residential house).
Natural Gas Utility Operations
The Utility currently produces minimal amounts of natural gas from fields in southern 
Montana and Wyoming. The Utility transferred almost all of its natural gas production 
properties in the United States and all of its Canadian natural gas production properties 
to an unregulated subsidiary on November 1, 1997, as a result of the Company's natural 
gas restructuring filing with the PSC. All of the Utility's natural gas customers are 
served from its 2,104 miles of transmission system and 3,451 miles of distribution 
mains, which extends through the western two-thirds of Montana. System reliability is 
enhanced by four natural gas storage fields which enable the Utility to store natural gas 
in excess of system load requirements during the summer for delivery during winter 
periods of peak demand.
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Non-Utility Oil & Gas Properties
As mentioned above, the Non-Utility operations include the transfer of almost all of the 
production properties from the Utility operations in 1997. Also in 1997, the company 
completed two major acquisitions, purchasing Vessels Energy’s oil and gas assets in 
Colorado’s Denver-Julesburg (D-J) Basin and a natural gas processing and fractionating 
plant near MPC’s existing Fort Lupton, Colorado plant. This purchase allows the 
company to enter the fractionated liquids business in the Denver area.
Currently, MPC owns or leases over 1,000 producing gas wells and 185 producing oil 
wells, in addition to owning and operating an 800-mile gas-gathering system in Alberta 
and the western United States. The Non-Utility Oil & Gas operations o f MPC can 
expect to grow over the next several years, as evidenced by plans to spend up to $56 
million in 1998 for exploration, acquisition and development of oil and gas properties. 
The Non-Utility Oil & Gas operations of the company are a significant part of MPC’s 
continued growth and diversification strategy.
Independent Power Properties
MPC’s Independent Power Operations (IPO) develop, acquire, operate and maintain, 
and manage facilities and resources to provide electricity and other energy-related 
services. Colstrip 4 Lease Management Division sells the Company's 222 megawatt 
share of Colstrip Unit 4 generation principally to the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power and to Puget Sound Energy, Inc. under contracts with a term through 
December 29, 2010. The Colstrip 4 leasehold interest and its related assets and
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liabilities and contract obligations are intended to be sold with the regulated electric 
generating facilities and power purchase contracts.
The IPO, through Continental Energy Services (CES), an MFC non-regulated 
subsidiary, develops and invests in power projects, and currently holds ownership 
interests in seven operating, natural gas fired projects located in Texas, New York, 
Washington and the United Kingdom, one heavy oil-fired project located in Jamaica 
and one gas-fired independent power project under construction in Pakistan. CES, 
through a wholly-owned subsidiary, is the managing general partner of a 255 MW 
project located in Texas. In addition, CES is participating with others in the 
development of a coal-fired project in India and an 800 MW gas-fired project in Texas. 
The interests in these projects are not being offered for sale with the regulated electric 
generating facilities.
Finally, CES holds a 50% interest in North American Energy Services Company, which 
provides energy-related support services including the operation and maintenance of 
power plants. The interest in North America is not being offered for sale at this time. 
Telecommunications Properties
MPC seems to be focusing most heavily on growing its telecommunications properties. 
Currently, Touch America has a 3,000-mile fiber optic network covering a seven-state 
region extending from Seattle, Washington to St. Paul, Minnesota and from Denver, 
Colorado to the Canadian border. Touch America continues to expand its network 
capacity. An additional 1,620 miles of fiber network being built will widen Touch 
America's service territory to 11 states. In January 1997, the Company acquired 12 
licenses in 12 marketing areas between Minneapolis, Minnesota and Seattle,
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Washington along the route of the fiber optic network, which presents an opportunity 
for wireless telephone service in that region.^^ These licenses allow larger volumes of 
traffic via a wider band widths and also allow the by-pass of local wired service. Touch 
America will begin beta testing the by-pass of US West copper wire in 1999. If 
successful, this new technology will open up local service to Touch America, a 
significant new field for the company 
Diverse Resource Base
As described above, the company has a diverse resource base that would have provided 
a competitive advantage in the deregulated marketplace, if the stranded cost recovery 
issues were not overwhelming. The coal-fired plants at Colstrip serve to balance 
hydroelectric availability, which (as mentioned earlier) are spread between two 
drainages, fiirthering the company’s ability to efficiently operate its generation 
facilities. The balancing capabilities of MPC’s generating assets, via coal- 
fired/hydroelectric and separate drainage for the hydro operations, will add to the value 
of the assets for sale.
The 6,900 miles of transmission lines in the state provides the backbone of the 
transmission system between Colstrip and the West Coast market. MFC’s system has 
interconnections to five major transmission systems located in the Western Systems 
Coordinating Council (WSCC) area, as well as one relatively small interconnection to a 
system that connects with the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) region. With 
these interconnections, the Montana Power Company electric transmission system is 
strategically located to allow for the purchase and delivery o f power in diverse markets
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-  from the Pacific Northwest, to the desert Southwest and California, to the Colorado 
area, and to a limited extent, the MAPP region.
Not to be forgotten in evaluating the diversity o f MPC’s resource base are the two areas 
o f the company that can offer more to the customer than just electricity. The natural gas 
and telecommunication properties give the company an opportunity to provide one-stop 
shopping for many types of customers. An example of this is provided in the SWOT 
analysis section discussion on the California Manufacturing Association 
Customer Loads & Relationships 
Service Area and Sales
The Utility's service territory comprises 107,600 square miles or approximately 73% of 
Montana. Within its service territory, 86% of the state's population resides. MPC serves 
approximately 603,000 residents, or 80% of the population within the service territory. 
Additionally, energy is provided to cooperatives that serve approximately 76,000 
residents.
Dominant factors in Montana's economy are agriculture and livestock, which together 
constitute Montana's largest industry. Other factors are tourism and recreation, coal and 
metals mining, oil and natural gas production, and the forest products industry, which 
includes the production of pulp and paper, plywood and lumber.
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Electric service is provided to 191 communities, the rural areas surrounding them and 
Yellowstone National Park, and natural gas service is provided to 109 communities. 
Firm electric power is sold at wholesale to two rural electric cooperatives 
In addition, the company also sells discounted power to California manufacturers and 
other out-of-state purchasers, such as to the city of Los Angeles and competing utilities 
in the WSCC. Natural gas is sold at wholesale to distribution companies in Great Falls, 
Cut Bank, Shelby, Kevin, Sweetgrass and Sunburst, Montana. Additional gas purchases 
are made by out-of-state brokers, who move MFC gas as far away as Texas and 
Southern California.
Cost of Service
MPC’s cost of service, which determines the revenue requirement requested by the 
company, is made up of two major components:
• Operating expenses, such as: purchased power expense, operating and maintenance 
costs of the generating plants, as well as the transmission and distribution facilities, 
administrative and general expenses, depreciation/amortization and income taxes. 
These costs are captured on the company’s books and records and are “normalized” 
as part of the rate filing, to eliminate any one-time or abnormal charges in the 
company’s books. MFC’s cost of service, before the calculation for a return on rate 
base, added up to $352.9 million for the 12 months ended December 31, 1995, per 
Exhibit 5 (column Y, row 56). If this amount is collected through rates, the 
company will just breakeven on its operating costs.
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♦ A return on rate base, which covers the cost of debt financing and compensates the 
equity owners for their investment. The return on rate base is calculated by taking 
the weighted average cost of capital for the utility times the electric utility rate base 
of the company. The rate base is primarily made up of capital investments made by 
the utility, which amounted to $1,063 billion as o f December 31, 1995. The 
weighted cost of capital for MPC’s December 31, 1995 rate filing was 9.59%, 
creating a requested return on rate base of $102.1 million.
The requested return on rate base is added to the cost of service calculation above to 
create the company’s revenue requirement request for the December 31, 1995 test 
period filing.
With the revenue requirements typically granted to MFC (which have been at times 
significantly less than the requested revenue requirement), the company has 
traditionally been considered a low cost provider of electricity, in comparison to other 
utilities in the western United States. As Exhibit 6 shows, MPC’s rates for its large 
commercial and small industrial customers rank second lowest, next to rates in Boise, 
Idaho (which is served by Idaho Power).
Residential rates rank 5^ of the eleven utilities compared. The residential class rates, 
even though large industrial customers have subsidized them, are not as low priced as 
other utilities in the West. This is primarily due to the lack of a significant population 
base in Montana to absorb the fixed capital costs of distributing power to a large 
geographic service area. This also causes the small commercial customers to pay the 5* 
highest rates, by comparison.
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As previously mentioned, MPC’s large industrial customers have felt the effects of 
MPC’s rate design methodology, as shown by the difference between small industrial, 
which has the second lowest rates and large industrial, which come in 4^ in its category. 
Without conducting a cost of service study, it can only be hypothesized that MPC’s 
large industrial customers would most probably pay the 2“** lowest rates if true cost-of- 
service rate making were applied.
Labor Force
At December 31, 1997, the Company and its subsidiaries employed 2,903 persons, 
including 385 employees at the jointly owned Colstrip Units 1-4. Over 500 employees 
work at the generating facilities now for sale.
Of the 2,903 persons, 1,038 are members of collective bargaining units consisting of 16 
unions. Current union contracts will expire at various times during the next 4 years, 
with 14 contracts expiring in 1998.
Corporate Culture
MPC’s corporate culture is changing, probably more now than anytime in the past. The 
catalyst for this change can only be speculated, but people familiar with the company 
attribute the change to two major factors: deregulation and a new style of leadership. 
Deregulation spawned the restructuring of the company into two divisions, Energy 
Supply and Energy and Services/Telecommunications. This action further led to the 
creation of the Shared Administrative Services function. With these changes came an 
assignment of officers to each of these three key areas. All of these changes combine to 
help the company culturally in several ways: having an officer in charge of all aspects
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of supply or all aspects of energy services (distribution) or shared administrative 
services has enhanced the coordination of employee efforts in their respective areas and 
has improved the focus of each division.
The reorganization has also reduced the “us vs. them” culture previously seen between 
Entech (the company’s non-utility arm) and MPC’s, in addition to eliminating the 
redundant work being done by Entech and MPC’s duplicated administrative 
departments. For example, collapsing duplicate tax, human resource, accounting and 
auditing departments into one department for each area has not only saved money, but 
has put employees together who previously may have had little contact with each other. 
In short, the reorganization o f MPC has helped eliminate former walls between Entech 
and MPC employees.
Other evidence of cultural change is the pay structure changes and promotion 
opportunities. Until recently, employees received pay raises and promotions based 
primarily on longevity with the company. The exception to this has always been the 
compensation plan for Touch America, which has for years been tied to the financial 
success of Touch America.
Not too long ago, offering an incentive program to employees that were directly 
responsible for the success (or failure) of the oil and gas trading programs was 
dismissed as a bad idea. It was believed that if this were done for one group of 
employees, others would feel slighted. These were the same employees who were being 
courted by large oil companies who used employee compensation incentive programs 
that rewarded performance on the job. The main reason there was not an exodus fi’om
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MPC and Entech is because the workforce is primarily Butte-bom people who prefer 
not to leave their hometown.
While compensation plans are not public knowledge, it is known that incentive plans 
today are much more common at MFC. Employee expectations are being redefined to 
reward productive actions and behaviors. Thinking innovatively, working in teams and 
going the extra mile for a customer are all becoming part of the employee appraisal 
system.
It will take a frustratingly long time for the majority o f the workforce to understand and 
support the cultural change that is taking place. But if this new culture can be instilled 
in everyone from the mailroom on up, the workforce will become part of the success of 
the company.
One of the hardest cultural changes for MFC will be getting employees to break out of 
their daily routine long enough to evaluate whether or not that routine is adding any 
value to the new company. It cannot be left up to management to go around to every 
employee and evaluate every task against the new yardstick So employees must be 
coached and trained to see their jobs in a new light and be rewarded for improving or 
revamping processes critical to the success of the new organization. This is much easier 
said than done, because no employee wants to believe what he/she has been doing is or 
will be o f no value, or may be a job that can be eliminated.
A new culture of learning also is important. If the previous skill sets of the employees 
are based in traditional utility operations, then they will be of little value to the new 
company, especially after the sale of the generating assets. Bringing in new people who
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have experience in aggressive marketing, deal structuring, actively managing processes 
and exploiting information technology will set a standard for others to follow. Perhaps 
this was MFC’s thought behind the recent hiring of a new Vice President of Marketing. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in Relationship to a 
Deregulated Market 
THE BUILDING OF A STRATEGY
Evaluating Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in the New Marketplace 
An analysis of MFC’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) in the 
new marketplace is critical to evaluating the potential effects of deregulation on the 
company. In a deregulated environment, it will be important to know MFC’s distinctive 
competencies and to match them to the new opportunities and risks presented by 
deregulation A SWOT analysis answers these competency and opportunity questions. 
Ideally, this analysis becomes a building block in establishing a corporate strategy that 
will exploit both MFC’s strengths and market opportunities. Likewise, such an analysis 
is necessary to assess weaknesses and new threats in the marketplace, with the goal of 
either addressing the weakness with an improvement plan or mitigating the threats by a 
new course of action.
When an industry goes through major changes, the framework in which it operates must 
be evaluated and reassessed by the standards now relevant in the “new” industry. 
According to Michael Porter, “The framework for viewing strengths and weaknesses 
illuminate two fundamentally different types: structural and implementational.”^̂  
Structural strengths and weaknesses are determined by the characteristics of the
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industry, while implementational strengths and weaknesses are determined by employee 
and management ability to execute the strategy.
Structural Strengths and Weaknesses
Traditionally, MPC, as well as the rest of the electric utility industry, has based its 
structural strengths on reliability of service and the guarantee of cost recovery (plus a 
return on rate base) via ratepayers. This had been done with the promise of a regulatory 
barrier against the entry of local competition, to protect both the ratepayer and the 
utility investor. While the promise of cost recovery was not always kept by the Montana 
PSC, the structural framework of cost recovery and utility franchise kept MPC’s 
investors satisfied for many decades and allowed enough return on rate base for the 
company to continue providing reliable service to the ratepayers of Montana.
In contrast, a deregulated environment means new structural strengths and weaknesses 
will be established for the industry. The main structural focus will be on competitively 
marketing energy in both current and new geographic regions. Reliability of service will 
still be important, but it will not be the only consideration. The ability of a utility to cost 
effectively implement technological advances, such as time-of-use meters and analytical 
monitors, will factor into the consumer’s decision making. New power supplies will be 
developed on a much smaller scale, because of technological advances that already have 
taken place in generation and the access to other under-utilized plants within the 
transmission grid. Utility companies increasing will use contracted firms to build and 
manage power plants. The dependence on regulatory approval, to determine if and when 
a power plant gets built, will be gone. Instead, energy can and will be traded by firms
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that do not own one kilowatt of electricity. The actual production of the energy will take 
a back seat to coordinating delivery across several transmission grids, ultimately 
providing power to a consumer several states away.
The real challenge for MPC will come from determining the relevant structural 
components for the new energy supply industry and reassessing its employee base in 
light of the need for new skills and capabilities. The company must move away from the 
temptation to prepare for competition by downsizing and cost-cutting. Instead, a 
marketing mindset must be instilled and information systems must be installed to 
support those who need the information to make marketing decisions.
Implementational Strengths and Weaknesses
Implementational strengths and weaknesses are identified by the ability of the company 
to implement its strategy. A company without the right skill set in its employees and 
managers will not be able to implement new strategy, let alone survive in a competitive 
world. Competition has caused a shift in what is now considered the right skills for 
utility personnel, with authority and accountability being shifted away from senior 
corporate management, toward those operating the power plants, transmission system 
and trading floor. Operating managers are beginning to have ‘̂ bottom-line” 
responsibilities for the first time. This is characteristic of the management style of one 
of the biggest emerging competitors in the energy business — NUGs, previously defined 
as Non-Utility G e n e r a t o r s . ^ ^  utilities are discovering that plants can be run more 
efficiently, with fewer employees. Many jobs previously done by company employees 
can be outsourced (at a substantial savings) to third-party personnel, especially ancillary
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services such as accounting and tax preparation. Utilities also have discovered that 
distracting management time on services that can just as easily be accomplished by an 
unaffiliated professional firm frees up senior management to concentrate on growing 
the business. Similar to NUGs, utilities will likely see outsourcing firms as an 
indispensable resource of the future.
Strategy
Business strategy typically will be targeted at one of four strategic areas — 
differentiation, technology, cost, or service.
It will be important for MPC to establish a strategy that answers the question “Which 
strategic area should the company compete in?” The choice may be determined by 
selecting the existing area that involves the best trade-off between profit potential and 
cost to compete, or by selecting an entirely new strategic area. With deregulation 
changing the way the company plans for the future, now would be the time to consider 
Porter’s caution that while a low cost position within a strategic area may well be 
critical, a focus on low cost position overall is not necessarily important or the only way 
to compete. In fact, becoming the low cost producer in a competitive environment may 
involve unacceptable sacrifices in one of the other strategic areas. Customers will 
tolerate higher rates from an energy supplier that provides exceptional service or has a 
new technology to offer, as long as the price is not so high as to induce the customer to 
give up on the better service or new technology. The customer’s choice also may hinge 
on loyalty developed through effective branding programs.
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Thinking in such terms is new for MPC. Traditionally, the focus has been on reliable, 
utility-type service and justifiable (to the PSC) operating costs and capital investments. 
MPC Strenphs
MPC has a competitive advantage over a utility that has solely operated as a vertically 
integrated company, as well as skills and knowledge of the employees in the non­
regulated side of the business.
Entech, formed in 1982, has owned and operated the non-utility assets of the 
corporation, including coal mines, oil and gas fields in Canada and the U.S., 
telecommunications and an unregulated power producer. Continental Energy Services. 
Continental Energy Services (CES) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MPC Beginning 
operations in 1988, CES has been in the energy marketing game through its role as an 
investor in unregulated power generation plants in the U.S. and abroad. Led by Dick 
Cromer, who now serves as the Vice-President of MPC’s newly formed Energy Supply 
Division, CES has gained some of the necessary experience for the deregulated 
generation business. While CES’s actual depth of knowledge in the deregulated market 
is still in question, the existence and experience of this company is definitely a strength 
for MPC.
In addition to CES, another strength is in the telecommunications division, headed by 
Mike Meldahl. While a very small part of the corporation in both asset base and 
revenue, the telecommunication division holds the promise of growth and possesses 
critical marketing skills. In 1997, Touch America contributed 6% to the corporation’s
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earning before interest and taxes (EBIT), a figure expected to grow significantly as 
Touch America aggressively expands its fiber optic network over the next year.
The telecommunication division of MPC is made up of two subsidiaries — Touch 
America (formally TRI Touch America) and Tetragenics. Touch Amercia (TA) is a 
long distance telecommunications provider with service from Seattle to Minneapolis. 
Even smaller revenues are generated by TA’s sister company — Tetragenics, the 
automated systems arm of MFC. Tetragenics expertise lies in developing and 
maintaining automated hydro facility systems. Although formally incorporated in 1982, 
Tetragenics began in 1972 when some engineers at MFC used a computer to automate a 
power plant. Their efforts helped start Tetragenics. Since then, the company has become 
an innovator and leader in the hydroelectric and data acquisition systems, pioneering 
one of the first efforts to use a computer to control a hydroelectric power plant 
successfully. Tetragenics employees know firsthand the effects of no revenue contracts 
in the door — no jobs. The company went through a relatively large layoff in 1985 
because there was no work. This is an unusual event for an employee attached to MFC, 
or any other utility for that matter, giving the surviving employees and management a 
glimpse of life in an unprotected industry
For many years, the telecommunication division’s employees have known how to be 
lean and mean in the marketplace. The future of the division depended on cost saving 
measures, strong marketing skills and a customer service focus. While the average 
employee at Entech (where Touch America formerly resided) was in typical corporate 
mode, not particularly aware of the cost of doing business or where the next revenue
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dollar for the company was coming from, TA employees were trying to figure out how 
they could get by with less expense. Also, marketing was, and still is, in the blood of 
TA employees, reinforced by a pay system tied to company performance. For these 
reasons, the telecommunication division of MPC is positioned for competition and can 
be counted as a strength of MPC
According to strategic research from Frost and Sullivan on U.S. strategies for utilities in 
telecommunications, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 presents new opportunities 
for utilities to leverage their customer base and valuable rights-of-way by offering 
bundled telecommunication and electric services, a package that is expected to be very 
popular according to the authors. This structure leads to a competitive advantage in that 
the utility already has established an extensive customer base, a reputation for providing 
reliable, high quality service and has a billing mechanism already in place. In addition, 
the telecommunications industry expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 
7%, compared with a stagnant 1.1% growth for the electric power industry for the 
forecast period 1996-2003.^" MPC is well positioned to bundle telecommunications and 
electric service and to be a seasoned participant in the high growth telecommunications 
industry.
The coal operations of the company also can be considered a real strength for the 
deregulated future for two reasons:
1. The coal business has become very competitive over the last decade, 
with the Powder River Basin over-supply, lower taxes on coal mined and 
inexpensive overburden removal costs. MPC’s Western Energy mine in
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Colstrip has had to compete with the Powder River Basin (PRB) supply in 
the Midwestern market, requiring cost-cutting and strategy planning 
indicative of a competitive company
MFC’s other coal mine, Northwestern Resources Co. (NWR) in Jewett, 
Texas, also has had to respond to increasing pressure from the PRB. NWR, a 
mine-mouth operation for Houston Light & Power’s (HL&P) Limestone 
Plants, just recently has come under the pressure o f litigation by HL&P. 
HL&P is attempting to break its life-of-mine contract with NWR, in the 
hopes o f capitalizing on the cheaper PRB coal NWR must prove to a jury 
that it runs an efficient, cost-effective operation and has done no harm to 
HL&P The mine’s plans for demonstrating a cost-effective future are 
equally as important as its past performance. This is another indication of the 
competitive nature of coal mining and a demonstration of the skill set within 
the company. A mine previously considered captive now has to prove it is a 
cost-efficient, competitive operation.
2. The contract administration department and management at Western 
Energy has established relationships over the years with utilities, energy 
analysts, governmental agencies and non-utility power producers throughout 
the United States. These connections have proven valuable in establishing 
joint ventures in both coal and plant operations over the past several years. 
For example. Western Syncoal (WSC) was formed through a joint-venture 
between Northern States Power and Western Energy with the purpose of
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commercializing a clean coal technology product. This $60 million capital 
investment project was 50% funded by the Department of Energy, with on­
going funding of the operation for a five-year period. This project would 
most likely not have been done without the relationships developed by 
Western Energy personnel.
MFC’s ability to further build customer loyalty will be a critical part of the new 
structure and strategy. Customer loyalty becomes a valuable marketing tool for 
companies going through deregulation. This is consistent with what has happened with 
the deregulation of the telecommunication industry. In telecommunications, effort is 
now put on added service features, loyalty to one company (“come home to AT&T”) 
and low rates that can easily be understood. The focus is on marketing service to the 
consumer, and the message is the company will take care o f the consumer, making their 
life easier.
MFC has consistently shown itself to be concerned about its customers, by such 
examples as; being responsive to service calls, offering free pilot lighting in the fall, 
promoting low-income energy assistance programs, hiring and training staff to handle 
large industrial and retail accounts individually and being a good corporate citizen in 
the communities which it operates. MFC can capitalize on the good name of the 
company and its management’s known integrity, where a handshake is all it takes to 
make a deal. This type of company integrity is of high value in the California market, 
where MFC hopes to grow.
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In developing new markets in California (to be discussed further in the Opportunities 
section) the company also can capitalize on the positive association with the state of 
Montana. Californians have long been attracted to Montana, which has been a 
marketing tool for company personnel now located in Los Angeles. In addition, the fact 
that MPC has no nuclear power plants and is at least partially a hydro-based utility 
(green energy) creates significant appeal to consumers in California. Of course, the 
company’s ability to capitalize on MFC’s resource base changes with the sale o f MFC’s 
generating assets.
MFC is to be applauded for hiring a non-utility marketing Vice-President. In 1997, W. 
S. Dee, 57, was elected Vice President, Marketing. He had been employed previously as 
policy teacher and consultant with Leo Burnett, Inc., an advertising agency, from 1993 
to 1996. Also, he had served as Chief Executive Officer and owner of W. S. Dee - 
Omega Beverages, a beverage manufacturing company, from 1991 to 1992. Mr Dee 
brings a fresh, competitive perspective to the traditional MFC utility.
Finally, the energy trading floor environment, operational for over a year now and led 
by senior management with expertise in oil and gas trading is a strength for MFC.
MPC Weaknesses
As previously mentioned, MFC’s relatively small operations and customer base, located 
in the remote state of Montana, are a weakness. Unless IndeGO, the regional 
transmission grid, is established, MFC will continue to face restricted access to the large 
West Coast markets. This will occur because of the pancaked transmission pricing 
previously discussed, especially when attempting to transport electricity across BFA’s
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system. In addition, the power flow from Montana to the West Coast will be tied more 
to the physical flow of electricity across numerous systems, instead of the concept 
discussed previously, where the system is like a lake (see the Transmission Intertie 
section) and the actual movement of one company’s power through of the system is less 
important than the replenishment of the “lake.”
Competing with BPA on price is another weakness for MPC. During high run-off years, 
the BPA has enough hydro generating capacity to restrict the operations at Colstrip, due 
to the inability o f MPC to economically dispatch the power plants. Since there is no 
strong intertie into the Midwestern markets, MPC has no choice but to idle the plants 
during these periods. This has occurred many times in the past several years, due to run­
off conditions favoring BPA. Again, this is a weakness that will go away with the sale 
of the generating assets. In fact, perhaps MPC will be able to negotiate a favorable 
supply contract with BPA, instead of trying to compete with them 
While MPC has some parts of the company with employees who have experience with 
competition (telecommunications, coal, oil and gas and the energy trading floor), the 
majority o f MPC’s 2,900 employees only have a utility background. These employees, 
along with their managers and officers, will have to be coached to change their focus 
and convinced that they cannot continue with business as usual.
Another weakness o f MPC is the centralized decision-making, where most decisions are 
made in Butte, Montana. This is in contrast to an emerging competitor, the NUG 
(previously identified as a Non-Utility Generator), where decisions and accountability 
are pushed down to the operations level. MPC’s decision-making structure has created a
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disconnection between corporate and the operations, with little cross training between 
the two.
While the skill set of trading floor can be accurately counted as a strength of the 
company, it also may be a weaknesses in that the depth and experience in this area may 
not be good enough to compete with the Enron’s of the world.
From a financial perspective, MPC shows weakness from the lease obligation 
associated with Colstrip 4. According to a Duff & Phelps credit rating report, ‘T)ebt to 
capital is at an acceptable level; however, the lease obligation associated with Colstrip 
Unit 4 creates an off-balance-sheet debt-like obligation. If the lease were on-balance- 
sheet, it would weaken leverage significantly.”
Also, Duff & Phelps note that MPC has higher business risk than a regulated utility due 
to its diversified businesses (coal, gas exploration and production, independent power, 
telecommunications and energy trading) As a result MPC requires stronger financial 
measures to offset the cash flow volatility associated with its diversified businesses. 
Opportunities for MPC
Opportunities in the marketplace are many for MPC. A key opportunity comes from the 
company’s approach to marketing its ability to “bundle” service for the customer, under 
a one stop shopping approach. Examples of these services include billing, metering, 
demand-side management, usage analysis, electric asset maintenance, power quality 
expertise, not to mention the customer’s telecommunications needs.
The fact that MPC could offer these services was a key advantage that help land a 
recent contract between MPC and the California Manufacturing Association (CMA).
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MPC was exclusively endorsed by the CMA to assist its members with their energy 
decisions. MPC will provide comprehensive energy services, including energy supply 
and energy management products and services to qualified CMA members. The CMA 
has agreed to endorse and promote such products and services to its members. The 
membership of the CMA is the target market for MPC in California. The approximate 
1,000 members of CMA represent an estimated 8 million megawatt hours of electric use 
annually.
The fact that MPC is selling its generating resource base, that has been underutilized by 
the native Montana load and hindered by unfair competition from BPA, is an 
opportunity for the company to redeploy its assets into more productive ventures.
MPC has developed good relationships with most of its customers over the years 
Residential customers know the company provides reliable service and is prompt to 
restore power when there is an outage. As the marketing from “outside” companies 
begins, MPC will be able to effectively counter the competition with an approach that 
focuses on MPC being a Montana-based company with a continued commitment to its 
customers. For the last several years, small commercial accounts have received 
attention from MPC employees who are specially trained and specifically assigned to 
that customer’s account. MPC’s relationship with large industrial accounts is not as 
positive, mostly because of the higher pricing MPC has offered to these customers over 
the past decade (the cross-subsidization issue discussed earlier).
MPC can use Tetragenics expertise to develop needed technology. Given Tetragenics’ 
expertise in developing dam monitoring devices, it seems a logical assumption that the
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technical skills developed by staff and management may be useful in applying the 
emerging technology of affordable time-of-use meters and analytical monitors.
Threats to MPC
The greatest external threat to MPC comes from timing. The saying ‘"timing is 
everything” certainly is applicable in the electric energy market today. A new 
marketplace is rapidly opening, and those first in the door will establish relationships 
and secure contracts that will be lucrative and much harder to get two or three years 
down the road. Companies must either be on the offense in the beginning or will be 
defending their dwindling customer base in a short period of time.
Therefore, MPC’s biggest threat comes from cherry-picking of large customers before 
the company is ready to compete in a deregulated market. This can happen in many 
ways: by not selling the company’s generating assets for at or near the asking price; by 
not coming to a satisfactory resolution on the distribution of the sale proceeds between 
ratepayers and the company, and therefore staying tied up in MPSC hearings for a long 
period of time; taking the anticipated two years to form IndeGO., if formed at all, 
leaving MPC with pancaked transmission rates during the interim; or, intervention by 
State officials trying to either stop the implementation of deregulation in the state or 
gain control over the sale of the generating assets.
Another main threat is that the best employees will be courted by other companies, 
especially trading floor employees. Potential new employers are other companies 
starting up a trading floor or other function related to deregulation, or existing 
competitive companies who are gearing up for the expanding deregulated market. A
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good example of this is the recent departure of Frank Rotondi, President & CEO of the 
MFC subsidiary charged with trading and marketing of electricity and gas. Mr. Rotondi 
has been hired by Shell Oil, to head up the establishment of a trading floor. He leaves 
behind a long career at MFC that recently led him to an officer position and the 
opportunity to work on implementing deregulation.
Other threats MFC must resolve are the issues surrounding its out-of-market contracts. 
These contracts involve not only sales of electricity, but also the long-term coal contract 
with HL&F, mentioned earlier. These contracts have vague clauses potentially allowing 
repudiation if certain indexes are exceeded. One such index, on an energy sale contract 
between MFC (seller) and another utility (buyer) is tied to market price, leaving the 
door open for endless court battles over whether the company can force the buyer to 
stay in a contract with out-of-market pricing. These types of contractual disputes not 
only detract management, they give MFC a bad reputation in the marketplace.
Another external force that threatens MFC’s success in deregulation is the MFSC. MFC 
and the MFSC must quickly come to agreement on issues critical to the implementation 
of deregulation. Examples of issues that must be resolved are how much money will be 
refunded to the ratepayers if MFC sells off any of its assets (as mentioned earlier); the 
establishment o f an equitable contract price for electricity between MFC’s deregulated 
Supply Division and regulated Energy Services Division, for those customers staying 
with MFC after choice is available; the allowance of expenses associated with the new 
corporate structure (especially for shared services between the new divisions).
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Finally, an external threat for any company today is a hostile takeover attempt. Hostile 
takeovers are generally difficult in the utility world, since the distribution of stock is 
held among a widely dispersed population of shareholders and there is a long wait for 
regulatory approval. However, arbitrage investment opportunists that are active in the 
marketplace today should not be ignored by MPC. The multiple state regulations in the 
U.S. have created isolated and protected electricity markets, with a resulting wide 
variation in prices. These variations set up arbitrage opportunities, where companies 
like Louis Dreyfus come into the market and change traditional utility thinking about 
energy deal-making. According to an article in Forbes, “Shortly after the 1992 Energy 
Policy Act was passed, Louis Dreyfus Electric Power Inc. became one of the first non­
utilities to receive a license from FERC to market power. Permit in hand, Louis Dreyfus 
made its first sale to San Diego Gas & Electric later that year, a one-year contract to 
deliver 50 megawatts per hour at 2.5 cent per MWh, which was about 20% below 
SDG&E’s cheapest alternative. As a principal in the transaction, Louis Dreyfus could 
either commission a utility to generate the power or buy it from members of the WSPP. 
Louis Dreyfus sold the power to SDG&E and then met its obligation by buying the 
power from members of the pool.”
The article goes on to say, “The deal took the industry by surprise. ‘The role of the 
merchant was very difficult for them to understand,’ says Paul Addis, a former grain 
trader who helped steer Louis Dreyfus into electricity. ‘They didn’t see our 
smokestacks, and they kept thinking there must be some trick.’ The trick was arbitrage. 
Evening out prices by buying where it is cheap and selling where it is dear Not only
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does arbitrage even out pricing, it takes advantage of the opportunities created by 
operating at less than optimal levels. When an arbitrager sees inefficiency, he/she goes 
in and make it efficient. If MPC is not ran effectively and is not aggressive in its energy 
trading activities, arbitrage companies like Louis Dreyfus could be considered a threat 
to MPC
Exposure to Load Loss
How many customers are capable o f switching
MPC s electrical restructuring informational filing, filed with the MPSC in December 
1996, stated MPC’s 269,000 residential customers must qualify to leave MPC’s system 
under a load transition schedule. The schedule placed a cap on the number of kilowatt 
hours, and hence customers, who could exit the system during the transition period. 
According to the Informational Filing proposed Electric Tariff DMA-1 (see attached 
Exhibit 7), the Residential Customer Choice Program would be limited to: 3,000 
customers until June 30, 2000; 25,000 customers from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2002; 
finally full power supply choice on July 1, 2002. This proposal was considered by most 
to be a defensive strategy, designed to protect MPC fi*om competition for as long as 
possible.
However, on July 2, 1997, after the passage of Montana’s new Electric Restructuring 
and Customer Choice law, the company revised its transition schedule to speed up open 
access for Montana consumers (see Changes in the Montana Regulatory and Legislative 
Environment).
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This proposed 4-year transition plan, where all customers will have choice starting on 
July 1, 2002, assumes the following; there will be adequate solutions for billing and 
metering of small customers; reciprocity will be in place with neighboring states that 
have opened their systems; and political problems are not overwhelming. If any of 
problems arise in these areas, the transition period will most likely be extended.
Stock and Financial Performance
This section will evaluate the stock and financial performance of the seven utilities 
considered being either competitors of MPC or potential merger/acquisition candidates. 
These utilities are: PacifiCorp, Puget Sound Energy, Idaho Power, Washington Water 
Power (WWP), Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Edison International. A detailed 
description of each company follows in the Potential Merger/Acquisition Candidates 
section, along with an assessment of company strategies in relation to deregulation, and 
how these strategies might blend or enhance MPC’s position in the marketplace.
Three key measurements will be defined, then analyzed, to assess companv valuation 
(Price to Earnings ratio), management effectiveness (Return on Equity) and financial 
strength (Debt to Equity ratio).
In addition. Exhibit 8 shows the stock performance of the seven companies over the 
past five years. All companies, except PG&E, have experienced an upward trend in 
stock prices, even though risk for the utility industry has significantly increased. The 
trend in stock price is measured by the EMA, or exponential moving average over the 
past 5 years. The EMA calculation takes the simple moving average (which is 
calculated by adding the closing prices for the 20 quarters being analyzed and dividing
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by 20) and places more weight on recent prices by applying a percentage of the most 
recent quarter’s closing price to the prior quarter’s moving average. Overall, stock 
prices for all seven companies have trended up over the past two years, during each 
company’s establishment of strategies to address deregulation.
All companies have outperformed the Dow Jones Western U.S. Electric Utilities Index 
on annualized total return, except Puget Sound Energy and PG&E (see Exhibit 9): 
Companv 5 Year Return*
MPC 12.73
PacifiCorp
Puget Sound Energy
Idaho Power
WWP
PG&E
Edison Intl.
9.28
6.90
9.16
9.94
5.64
9.54
Industry Index 
7.96
Equity Market Index 
22.81
* 5 year anmaUzed return (expressed in percent)
The increased risk for the utility industry (as measured by the Dow Jones Western U.S. 
Electric Utilities Index vs. the Dow Jones Equity Market Index) shows the relatively 
poor performance of the utility industry in the equity market over the past five years.
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with the western utility industry recording an annualized return of 7.96%, against an 
annualized equity market index of 22.81%. Therefore, while stock values for the seven 
companies are trending upward, charts showing the Five-Year Total Return for each 
company, compared to the DJ Equity Market Index, are well below equity market 
standards (see Exhibit 9).
Finally, Exhibits 10 and 11 provide December 31^ fiscal year end 1995, 1996 and 1997 
comparative income statements, and fiscal year end 1996 and 1997 balance sheets. 
Company Valuation
Ratios such as Price to Earnings, Price to Book and Price to Sales are measures of the 
value of a company’s shares in the marketplace. Therefore, they are a general indication 
of the company’s value in the marketplace, via the stock price on a given date. For 
purposes of this paper, the Price to Earnings (P/E) ratio is used as the measuring tool to 
determine company valuation for the seven utilities.
Price to Earnings Ratio
The P/E ratio shows the amount investors are willing to pay for each dollar of corporate 
earnings. The calculation used in Exhibit 12 was made by dividing the closing stock 
price on March 31, 1998 by the sum of the trailing four quarters of EPS (earnings per 
share). The industry average P/E ratio of 16.30 is based on a comparison against the 
Dow Jones Western U.S. Electric Utility index.
Management Effectiveness
Financial ratios, such as return on assets and return on equity, evaluate management’s 
effectiveness by looking at the organization’s operating success and failure through an
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accounting period and associating the income earned with the amount of resources 
utilized. Return on equity (ROE) will be analyzed to determine management 
effectiveness.
Return on Equity
ROE is a measure of the company’s profitability, as expressed in a percentage. Exhibit 
13 shows the calculation for each company, based on the trailing four quarters of net 
income (fi’om total operations) divided by the common equity figure fi*om the March 
1997 10-Q filing.
Financial Strength
The financial strength of a company is typically determined by evaluating company 
solvency For this reason, debt capacity ratios are used to judge solvency. These ratios 
are o f primary importance to long-term creditors who have an obvious concern 
regarding the receipt of interest and the repayment of amounts borrowed. Debt ratios, in 
general, reveal the effect of financial leverage or the solvency of the company. The debt 
to equity ratio will be used to evaluate financial strength of the seven companies.
Debt to Equity Ratio
The Debt to Equity ratio measures a company’s financial strength by evaluating debt 
capacity and utilization. It is an expression of the relationship between financial 
resources provided from creditors and those provided by equity owners, measuring the 
relative risk assumed by each class of provider and the degree of protection provided by 
equity owners for creditors. The Debt to Equity ratios in Exhibit 14 are calculated by 
taking long-term debt divided by common equity fi^om the March 31, 1998 10-Q filings.
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Besides the three financial measures mentioned above, it is worth noting that all seven 
utilities have included a discussion in their fiscal year end 12/31/97 annual reports on 
the potential impact if the utility operations are required to apply FASB Statement No. 
101 -  ‘‘Regulated Enterprises -  Accounting for the Discontinuation of Application of 
FASB NO 71"
Statement No. 71 requires the Company to defer certain costs that would otherwise be 
charged to expense, if it is probable that future rates will permit recovery of such costs. 
These costs create what is known as regulatory assets. Accounting for regulatory assets 
under Statement No. 71 is appropriate as long as: rates are established by or subject to 
approval by independent, third-party regulators; rates are designed to recover the 
specific enterprise's cost-of-service; in view of demand for service, it is reasonable to 
assume that rates set at levels that will recover costs can be charged to and collected 
fi*om customers. Adoption of Statement No. 101 would require the write-off of 
regulatory assets and liabilities related to those operations not meeting Statement No. 
71, highlighting the increased shareholder and creditor risk in the utility industry as a 
whole.
Analysis of the P/E ratio, ROE, and debt to equity ratio mentioned above, for MFC and 
the six utilities considered as merger or acquisition candidates, is as follows:
MFC 
P/E ratio
As Exhibit 12 shows, MPC’s shareholders are slightly more willing (then the 
typical utility stockholder) to pay for corporate earnings, with a P/E ratio of
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17.60. This ratio has been driven down in the last two quarters, via strong 
financial performance in the 4^ quarter 1997, where EPS shot from $.28/share 
the previous quarter to $.93/share at 12/31/97, without an equal increase in stock 
price. This effect was countered by an unusually high stock price at 3/31/98, 
which boosted MPC’s P/E ratio.
It is reasonable to assume that MPC will continue to outperform the industry on 
the P/E ratio, due to the diversity of the company (telecommunications, oil & 
gas, energy trading, etc.) and the sale of generation assets, both viewed as 
positive by stock market analysts.
Stock prices for the past several years has ranged around $20/share. However, 
the stock prices in the past year have significantly outperformed market 
expectation, with a 52-week high of $38.50 (see Exhibit 8). Speculation has 
credited the jump with the settlement of long-disputed contracts with Puget 
Sound Energy, along with the proposed sale of the company’s generating assets 
and the company’s strategy to grow in telecommunications.
Return on Equity
MPC’s 11.5% ROE is virtually the same as the industry average of 11.6%, 
indicating acceptable profitability for the common equity investment employed. 
An evaluation of the consolidated net income EPS shows a shift over the past 
three years away from utility operations, toward non-utility earnings. This is 
most likely indicative of the coming years, given deregulation and the expected 
growth of the telecommunications division:
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Utility Operations 
Non-utility Operations
1997 1996 1995
$1.08 $1.13 $1.22
$1.21 $0.90 $(.30)
$2.29 $2.03 $0.90Consolidated Net Income  
Debt to Equity ratio
At a .65 debt to equity ratio, MPC is at only 46.8% of the industry average of 
1.39. This indicates that the company is leveraged significantly less than other 
companies in the industry and would be in a position to either acquire additional 
assets through debt financing or raise significant cash if the need arose. This 
ratio could decrease even further with the sale o f the company’s generating 
assets, assuming the company would pay off some existing debt with the 
proceeds.
However, one adjustment that needs to be considered when evaluating MFC’s 
debt to equity ratio is the off balance sheet long term lease obligation with 
Colstrip Unit #4. If this obligation were on the balance sheet, it would weaken 
the company’s leverage significantly.^^
In summary, MFC is currently in a stable financial position. The F/E ratio and 
ROE indicate that the company’s effort to embrace deregulation, an admittedly 
riskier line of business, has been received favorably by the investment 
community. Stock performance, in particular over the past two years, has been 
very strong. The financial outlook is positive for the company. However, as 
mentioned above, the Debt to Equity ratio is actually higher than it appears on
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the balance sheet, due to the off balance sheet lease obligation with Colstrip #4. 
Analysts caution that this item would significantly weaken MPC’s leverage if it 
were on the balance sheet.
PacifiCorp 
P/E ratio
PacifiCorp’s P/E ratio is being driven down by the volatility of the company. 
This volatility is brought on by the attempted acquisition of the Energy Group, 
the largest electric utility in England. The effects of this attempted acquisition 
are discussed in more detail in the following Potential Merger/Acquisition 
Candidates section.
PacifiCorp’s P/E ratio was negatively impacted by a 4^ quarter sell-off of 
several subsidiaries, namely Pacific Telcom on December 1, 1997; Pacific 
Generation on November 5, 1997 and TPC (the gas gathering and processing 
subsidiary) on December 1, 1997, which raised earnings without a 
corresponding increase in stock price.
In 1997, PacifiCorp generated $1.8 billion in cash (excluding $370 million in 
income tax liability) from the sale of assets with a carrying value of $822 
million. The primary contributor to the $454 million in income from 
discontinued operations in 1997 was the sale of Pacific Telcom, with a net gain 
of $365 million.
The sale of these assets had a significant effect on the 4-quarter EPS average. 
Quarter ending EPS
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June 30, 1997 $ . 3 0
Sept. 30, 1997 $ .23
Dec. 31,1997 $1.29
Mar. 31, 1998 ($.07)
PacifiCorp’s net income from continuing operations decreased 49% to $205.4 
million in the 4^ quarter 1997 This continued dismal performance is also 
revealed in the first quarter 1998 EPS figure. Performance from continuing 
operations will continue to be lower than industry averages, until the merger 
issued is settled.
PacifiCorp’s P/E ratio can be expected to improve significantly once the 4^ 
quarter 1997 boost from asset sales is removed from the calculation, assuming 
the stock market will still be willing to pay $23-$26 per share. Stock prices 
continue to show an upward trend over the past five years (see Exhibit 8), 
despite a recent drop from $24+/share in 4^ quarter 1997 to $22/share in 2"  ̂
quarter 1998.
Return on Equity
PacifiCorp’s current 12.8% ROE is being shored up by the sell-ofF of assets, 
previously mentioned Taking away the 4* quarter 1997 $454 million in net 
income from discontinued operations would decrease the 1997 ROE to 4.3%, 
approximately 1/3 of the industry average of 11.6%. PacifiCorp shareholders 
may be gambling that poor short-term performance will pay off by positioning
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the company as a leading global distributor and merchant energy company, thus 
providing a long-term ROE that will outperform the industry.
Debt to Equity ratio
PacifiCorp’s Debt to Equity ratio at 12/31/97 was 1.04, measured against an 
industry average of 1.39. The effects of the company’s attempted acquisition of 
Energy Group is not yet showing on the balance sheet. However, credit rating 
companies are cautioning that the proposed $3.8 billion in assumed debt and 
lease obligation associated with the acquisition will materially increase 
consolidated debt leverage and weaken credit protection measures.
In summary, PacifiCorp’s attempted acquisition of Energy Group has, at least on 
a short-term basis, harmed the financial position of the company However, 
shareholders seem to be willing to tolerate the low financial performance for the 
now.
Puget Sound Energy
P/E ratio
Puget’s P/E ratio is slightly below industry average, at 15.70. This ratio shows 
high potential for improvement, assuming Puget has placed itself in a strategic 
growth position with the February 1997 merger of Washington Energy 
Company and its subsidiary Washington Natural Gas Company. The merger 
called for each share of Washington stock to be exchanged for .86 share of 
Puget. At the merger date, holders o f Puget’s and Washington’s common stock 
held approximately 75% and 25% respectively, of the aggregate number of
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outstanding shares of the merged company’s common stock. Additional stock 
price growth potential comes from the April 1998 energy-marketing and trading 
agreement between Puget and Duke Energy, which is discussed in more detail in 
the Potential Merger/Acquisition Candidates section. Analysts should view both 
the acquisition and marketing agreement favorably, giving the potential for an 
improved stock price and P/E ratio.
The P/E ratio is positively effected by 1997 net income from continued 
operations, which fell 25% to $108.4 million (although revenues rose 2% to 
$1.68 billion) without a corresponding decrease in stock price. Part of the net 
income decline is due to $55.8 million in merger-related costs and the buyout of 
several expensive gas purchase contracts, both non-reoccurring expenses that the 
stock market has not penalized. Another positive effect on the P/E ratio results 
from stock prices being strong over the past year, with a continued growth trend 
expected (see Exhibit 8).
Return on Equity
Puget, as with MPC, is at 99.1% of the industry average ROE, recording 11.5% 
at fiscal year end 12/31/97. Prospects for future improvement of ROE are good, 
with the one-time merger and gas contract buyout costs already absorbed and the 
Washington Energy merger and Duke Energy marketing agreement in place for 
the friture.
Debt to Equity ratio
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As with MPC and PacifiCorp, Puget’s debt to equity ratio is below industry 
average, at 1.01. Further, a review of Puget’s balance sheet over the last two 
years shows that the debt to equity ratio has remained consistently below 
industry average. The company should be able to leverage its relatively low debt 
position, if additional mergers or acquisition possibilities are pursued 
In summary, Puget, like MPC, is financially sound and is viewed positively by 
the market. Ratios indicate the company is stable and could continue to acquire 
or merge if such action was consistent with the company’s strategy.
Idaho Power 
P/E ratio
Idaho Power also has a P/E ratio slightly below industry average, at 15.20. BPS 
has remained relatively stable over the preceding four quarters, as has the stock 
price.
Idaho is a very stable company, with little fluctuation in net income over the 
prior three years. Stock prices have grown significantly since 1994, from a low 
of $23+/share to a June 1998 price of $34+/share (see Exhibit 8).
The prospects for Idaho are positive, with investments in solar energy and 
increased sales from new activity in the wholesale trading market. In fiscal year 
1997, revenues rose 29% to $748.5 million, primarily from the new trading 
activity focus of the company.
The prospects for Idaho’s P/E ratio should be good, with continued growth in 
trading and the development of new solar technology (discussed in more detail
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in the Potential Merger/Acquisition Candidates section) fueling a steady climb 
in the stock price.
Return on Equity
Idaho’s ROE climbed to 109% above the industry average at 12.70% at March 
31, 1998. The higher than industry performance over the past two years was 
fueled b y a l *  quarter 1998 net income of $29.5 million, up $9 million over the 
previous quarter. First quarter revenues increased by $21 million, mostly in new 
trading revenues, with only an $8 million increase in associated operation 
expenses. The company is not infusing additional equity at this time The 
prospects for continued growth in energy trading revenues is high, thus the ROE 
should continue an upward trend.
Debt to Equity ratio
Like the other utilities analyzed so far, Idaho has a low debt to equity ratio At 
1.04, the ratio is 75% of the industry average of 1.39. There has been little 
fluctuation in company’s debt load over the past two years. The under-utilization 
of leverage could allow Idaho to secure additional debt, to perhaps grow its new 
solar technology investments or develop new energy efficiency technologies. 
Idaho’s growth potential will be discussed more in the Potential 
Merger/Acquisition Candidates section.
In summary, all indicators point to a healthy, growing Idaho Power. The 
company has the capacity to raise additional capital for new technology 
development, if it chooses. The revenue stream shows good promise, from
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increased trading activities. Stock prices should continue to climb, as the 
company develops new solar technology while taking a defensive strategy 
toward deregulation (which is discussed in more detail in the next section). 
Washington Water Power 
P/E ratio
WWP has the poorest P/E ratio performance of the seven utilities analyzed, with 
a ratio of 10.90. One possible reason WWP cannot attract more money for its 
stock is the volatility of the EPS over the past two years. EPS has ranged from 
$. 12/share in June 1996 to $.83/share in June 1997. Fiscal year 1997 revenues 
rose 38% to $1.30 billion, while net income applicable to common rose 45% to 
$109.4 million. The revenues reflect higher transmission revenues due to 
increased wholesale electric sales.
WWP is considered a conservative company, with modest growth predictions 
and a stand against deregulation. In a time of market uncertainty, being 
conservative may be penalized. This is perhaps another reason the P/E ratio is 
held below industry average.
Return on Equity
Conversely, WWP’s ROE outperforms the industry with a return of 15.4%, 
132.8% of the industry average. Coupled with the P/E ratio, there is an 
indication that recent higher than average earnings for WWP have driven both 
ratios (increasing the P/E denominator and ROE numerator without a 
corresponding increase in stock or equity over the short term).
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Looking at WWP’s net income from operations for the past several years shows 
that 1997 earnings were 38% higher than 1996. Some of this improvement 
comes from two new unregulated energy and marketing service subsidiaries -  
Advantage, Inc. and Avista Energy Inc.. More than likely, the market has not 
had enough time, or not enough inclination, to move the stock price up more 
than from approximately 19+/share in 1996 to $22+/share in 1998. For the 
future, WWP’s ROE should moderate if the company continues to record 
earnings at the 1997 level.
Debt to Equity ratio
Finally, WWP’s debt to equity ratio is below industry average, at a ratio of .96. 
As mentioned with the previous utilities that have below average debt to equity 
ratios, WWP has the capability to secure funding, if the company chooses to 
grow through a strategic acquisition or development of an existing business 
segment.
In summary, WWP is a conservative company that does not achieve the stock 
price its recent performance warrants. However, the two new subsidiaries 
mentioned above, while inherently riskier, may provide adequate growth to 
warrant better stock prices for the company. The company does has debt 
capacity to grow.
PG&E 
P/E ratio
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PG&E has the strongest P/E ratio of the seven utilities analyzed, at 19.90. The 
company has been able to hold or increase its stock price over the past four 
quarters, even with volatile EPS’s that range from $.62/share in September 1997 
to $.22/share in December 1997. For fiscal year 1997, revenues rose 60% to 
$15.4 billion. Net income fell 1% to $716 million. Revenues reflect a $4.52 
billion rise in unregulated energy commodities and services revenue due to 
recent acquisitions. Earnings lagged due to low margins on unregulated activity 
and higher depreciation. The lower earnings, without a corresponding drop in 
stock price, has (perhaps temporarily) boosted the P/E ratio.
Stock prices have held above $29/share for the last three quarters, but are 
significantly below the $35+/share price from five years ago (see Exhibit 8).
As mentioned in detail later, PG&E is divesting itself o f its electric generation 
plants in Northern California and is aggressively growing its electric and 
information management services and its environmentally-friendly electric 
supply options. The stock market is responding favorably to PG&E’s strategy to 
grow into a national energy company, as indicated by their strong P/E ratio and 
improved stock performance this past year.
Return on Equity
PG&E’s ROE is not as impressive as its P/E ratio, with a ROE at 8.7%, which is 
75.7% of the industry average. The major influence on PG&E’s March 31, 1998 
ROE is the dismal performance in the 4^ quarter 1997 Operating revenues 
declined because of a 10 percent electric rate reduction provided to residential
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and small commercial customers and due to changes in regulatory adjustment 
mechanisms resulting from electric industry restructuring. Both of these 
changes drove earnings and ROE down. During the last quarter of 1997, the 
electric rate reduction decreased operating revenues by approximately $100 
million
Debt to Equity ratio
PG&E is leveraged at approximately the industry average, with a debt to equity 
ratio of 1.32, compared to the industry average of 1.39. This ratio has gone up 
significantly in the past year, after PG&E bought a portfolio of electric 
generating assets and power supply contracts from the New England Electric 
System (NEES) for $1.59 billion. Financing requirements totaled approximately 
$1.75 billion, of which approximately $1.25 billion were funded through debt. 
However, plans are underway for PG&E to sell off its non-nuclear generating 
facilities in California, which will free up significant amounts of cash, most 
likely lowering the debt to equity ratio, positioning PG&E to make further debt- 
funded acquisitions, if it chooses to do so in the future.
In summary, PG&E is in a transition period that is reflecting in a slightly 
negative way on its income statement. A rate reduction order in the core market 
has squeezed utility revenues. New business is just beginning to form, as 
discussed in the next section. The net income over the past five years has 
declined from a high of $1.34 billion to $716 million in 1997. Also, PG&E’s 
total return performance has lagged slightly behind the annualized industry
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growth index for the same time period. These are all indications that PG&E 
needs to be successful in their new ventures in order to maintain its strong P/E 
ratio and continue growing the company’s value in the stock market.
Edison International 
P/E ratio
Edison’s P/E ratio is the closest to industry average, at 16.90. The company 
responded to new competition by selling several of its generating plants and 
investing in new technology associated with the electric-vehicle market. Current 
earnings are being pressed downward by the accelerated depreciation of 
Edison’s nuclear investments and the termination costs associated with its 
above-market fixed-rate QF purchased power contracts. The company will 
benefit in the long term from these write-offs, which should continue to boost 
the stock price as well as the EPS. Edison’s stock price has done very well in the 
past three years (see Exhibit 8).
Another factor effecting the P/E ratio is outstanding stock, which has fallen from 
440 million shares in June 1996 to 366 million in March 1998, through a stock 
repurchase plan. The company intends to continue the repurchase of stock, 
which will likewise continue to lower the P/E ratio. However, stock analysts will 
more than likely view the company positively, compensating for the pressure 
from the stock repurchase program.
Return on Equity
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Edison’s ROE is at 13.1%, compared to the industry average of 11.6%. Again, 
as with the P/E ratio, Edison’s stock repurchase program will effect the ROE 
calculation, by decreasing the denominator and therefore increasing the ROE 
As previously discussed in Branding Utility Products section, the company is 
poising itself for competition, through the development of the electric vehicle 
market and other non-utility ventures. These investments, through the utilization 
of cash generated by the sale of power plants in California, should allow the 
ROE to stay above industry average for the foreseeable future, assuming the 
new ventures generate more net income than the generating station investments 
Given that today power sells cheaper on the open market than it can be produced 
from a traditional generating station, the assumption that the new investments 
should generate more return should be correct.
Debt to Equity ratio
Finally, Edison’s debt to equity is 1.66, or 119.4% of industry average. Again, 
the repurchase of stock will effect this measure, in a negative way, by lowering 
the proportion of equity to debt. In addition to shrinking equity, Edison also 
increased long-term debt by over $1.3 billion from 1996 to 1997. This increase 
was driven by the issuance of $2.5 billion in rate reduction notes in December 
1997, prompted by the move to deregulation in California and the attempt by 
Edison to remain whole during the transition period. The rate reduction notes 
reflect the Edison’s right to be paid a specified amount from a non-bypassable 
tariff levied on residential and small commercial customers (i.e. transition
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costs). Edison used the proceeds from the note sales to retire debt and equity 
securities.
In summary, Edison is a strong company, with an accepted growth strategy and 
diversification in non-utility arenas. Earnings per share and net income are 
strong, as indicated by above average price to earnings and return on equity 
measures Stock prices have continued to climb over the past two years, 
doubling from a low of $15/share in June 1996 to $30 1/2/share in April 1998 
(see Exhibit 8). Capitalizing on the company’s right to collect transition costs, 
by issuing $2.5 billion in rate reduction notes, has jumped the company’s debt, 
but not to unacceptable levels.
Summary
This section has recapped the stock and financial performance of the seven utilities 
being evaluated by measuring stock performance, company valuation, management 
effectiveness and financial strength. In addition, each utility and the western U.S. utility 
industry were evaluated against the Dow Jones equity market for five-year total return. 
While all companies are attempting to grow their enterprises through non-utility 
activities, some are proving more successful, with less risk. MPC, Puget and Edison 
Intl. are strong companies, with acceptable financial measures and strategies to 
diversify into non-utility businesses. PG&E has lost ground in the past several years, as 
its core market has eroded and rate reduction measures have taken a toll on operating 
revenues. Idaho Power and WWP are conservative companies, which do not embrace 
deregulation. Idaho’s performance in the stock market has been better than WWP’s,
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most likely due to the potential for development of its solar energy technology. 
PacifiCorp may ultimately be successful in growing shareholder value through the 
acquisition of Energy Group, but its current financial condition is jeopardized by this 
activity.
The next section will discuss each of the seven companies in more detail.
Potential Merger Candidates/Competitors
The following companies were chosen as potential merger candidates or direct 
competitors of MPC, based on either geographic proximity to MPC; a prior relationship 
with MPC; or by an industry analyst selection. Specifically, PacifiCorp, Puget Sound 
Energy, PG&E and WWP are partners in the Colstrip power plants. Idaho Power is a 
geographic neighbor to MPC Finally, PG&E and Edison Intl. are listed as top 
competitors of MPC by the Hoovers On-line internet service.
This section will describe each competitor, its strategy and how that strategy may fit
with MPC
PacifiCorp
PacifiCorp, one of the lowest-cost electricity producers in the United States, is a 
multinational energy company with 1.4 million retail electric customers in the western 
United States and 550,000 customers in the State of Victoria, Australia. PacifiCorp, 
which has more than 10,000 megawatts of generation capacity, also is the largest 
investor-owned bulk power marketer in the western U.S. and is an active electricity and 
gas marketer in the eastern U.S.. The company’s strategy is to focus on utility
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operations and therefore is selling its natural gas pipeline and processing systems and 
some of its generation units.
PacifiCorp has a foreign growth strategy that includes acquiring the largest electric 
utility in England, Energy Group. The attempted acquisition of Energy Group, the 
parent company of Eastern Electricity PLC and Peabody Coal, has been stalled by a 
rival bid from Texas Utilities. PacifiCorp’s latest bid is for $6.6 billion in cash and $4.1 
billion in assumed debt and lease obligations. PacifiCorp plans to fund the acquisition 
largely with debt and the sale of non-core assets. According to a Duff & Phelps report, 
the new debt will materially increase the company’s consolidated debt leverage and 
weaken credit protection measures. Therefore, the ratings for PacifiCorp bonds have 
been downgraded and are on a rating watch.^*
A merger with or (more likely) acquisition o f MPC by PacifiCorp would not make 
sense at this time, if PacifiCorp is successful in the acquisition of Energy Group. The 
company will presumably not be in a position to merge or acquire any other companies 
in the foreseeable future, given the debt load assumed. In addition, PacifiCorp is 
seeking to grow in the international market, becoming a leading global distribution and 
merchant energy company that creates operating synergies, with a diversified 
geographic presence in the U.S., Australia and England. There is little in this strategy to 
support the blending of MPC and PacifiCorp through acquisition or merger, except the 
two areas mentioned below, which most likely would not be compelling enough to 
argue for consolidation of the two companies:
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• One area of possible merger consideration is MFC’s non-regulated energy company, 
CES, which has ownership and operating interests in several power projects in the 
United Kingdom. Depending on the needs of the combined PacifiCorp/Energy 
Group, these projects could prove useful as energy resources or operating expertise.
•  Another consideration is the potential for a coal operation merger between 
PacifiCorp and MPC. Assuming PacifiCorp is successful with the Energy Group 
acquisition, Peabody Coal will become part of the corporation. Peabody is the 
world’s largest private producer of coal. If PacifiCorp intends to grow its coal 
operations, a merger with MFC’s coal holdings, listed as one of the top ten 
producers in the U.S., would make sense.
However, as previously mentioned, it is unlikely either company would seek a merger 
or acquisition.
Puget Sound Energy
Puget seeks to build on the strengths of its efficient electric distribution and 
transmission system to become a leading provider of energy and related services to 
homes and businesses in the Pacific Northwest. To prepare for a more competitive 
business environment, Puget has committed itself to being a low cost supplier of 
electricity, by reducing costs, work force reductions, facility consolidations and 
reductions in capital budgets. Puget intends to pursue opportunities for improved 
operating efficiencies and productivity, including possible restructuring of its power 
supply resources and contracts.
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Generation owned by Puget includes a 50/50 ownership with Montana Power of the 
twin-333 megawatt (MW) Colstrip Units 1&2 and a 25% interest in the twin-805 MW 
Colstrip Units 3 & 4. In addition, Puget purchases 94 MW from MPC’s leased-back 
interest in Colstrip Unit 4. Besides the interest in the Colstrip plants, Puget owns little 
generation, instead meeting electrical demand through purchase power contracts 
In addition to its electrical operations, Puget is now the largest gas utility in the Pacific 
Northwest. The company achieved this status (as mentioned earlier) by acquiring 
Washington Energy Company and its subsidiary Washington Natural Gas Company in 
February 1997. Besides its own production, the company purchases a blended portfolio 
of long-term firm, short-term firm, and spot gas supplies from major and independent 
producers and gas marketers in the U.S. and Canada.
Also, Puget is actively pursuing opportunities to become a provider of new high value 
services such as wireless automated meter-based services and geographic information 
systems to utility customers and other utilities.
A recent development is the announced agreement between Puget and Duke Energy 
Trading and Marketing of Houston, Texas. The two companies have agreed to 
coordinate their energy-marketing and trading activities in 14 western states and British 
Columbia. Based in Salt Lake City, the combined energy trading activities of the two 
companies will focus on power marketing and trading business in the WSCC region. 
According to Duke, “Puget’s power-asset position in energy trading and its expertise in 
this region will bolster our operations. The new capabilities created by this expanded 
relationship effectively integrates with the power plants Duke Energy is purchasing
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from Pacific Gas & E le c t r i c . T h r o u g h  this new relationship, Puget will now 
participate in an energy-trading business many times the size of its former trading 
activities.
How this partnership will effect a potential merger with or acquisition of MPC depends 
on whether Duke and Puget would see advantages to further expanding a combined 
presence in the region and whether MPC s trading floor expertise is seen as a valued 
asset.
A merger or acquisition between MPC and Puget would have made more sense before 
the decision by MPC to sell off its generating assets. The growing customer base in the 
Pacific Northwest (the fastest growing region in the nation), coupled with the 
generating assets of MPC, would have created a company of significant size, with 
diverse electric generating resources (both purchased and owned).
Merging the two companies could still make sense from an energy services standpoint, 
to gain economies of scale and efficiencies (consolidating administrative functions, 
energy trading activities, etc.) and gaining some seasonal load variations between 
Montana and the West Coast. Also worth considering is the experience these two 
companies have with each other, via the common ownership at Colstrip. Each company 
knows the other’s corporate culture and can assess the ability to blend the two 
companies In addition, Puget and MPC have worked together recently to resolve 
longstanding contractual disputes over Puget’s Colstrip Unit 4 purchase power contract 
and the coal contract pricing between Western Energy and the Colstrip units. These
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settlements clear the way for a more harmonious relationship between the two 
companies.
Finally, a consolidation is viable when considering other parts of the two companies 
from a strategic point of view. One such area could be the combining of MPC’s and 
Puget’s gas operations. As stated earlier, Puget is the largest gas utility in the Pacific 
Northwest, with large owned gas supplies and purchased gas contracts. MPC, which 
also has its own production and storage fields, could combine with Puget to capitalize 
on the spot market by increasing production when market prices are high and inject its 
production into storage when market prices are low, saving the gas for the future. This 
would cushion both MPC’s and Puget’s exposure to market volatility, in addition to 
giving MPC a much larger market to sell into on the West Coast.
Given MPC’s expansion plans in its oil and gas operations, evidenced by the $56 
million acquisition exploration and development budget for 1998, and its expertise in 
oil and gas trading, it appears MPC is positioning itself to be a bigger player in Western 
U.S. gas operations. Puget and MPC together may make a lot of sense from a gas utility 
standpoint and from the desire of both companies to develop or utilize new technologies 
to serve the customer, via either telecommunications or technological advances in 
metering, geographic information systems, or other technology-based advances Finally, 
MPC’s fiber optic reach into Seattle and Puget’s large customer base become a natural 
fit for Puget and MPC’s telecommunications arm.
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With MPC being approximately 60% of the size of Puget, it would make sense for 
Puget to pursue an acquisition of MPC, if a consolidation were to occur. Or, both 
companies could agree to a merger. It is unlikely that MPC would acquire Puget.
Idaho Power
Idaho Power Company is an electric utility engaged in the generation, purchase, 
transmission, distribution and sale of electric energy in an approximate 20,000-square- 
mile area in southern Idaho, eastern Oregon and northern Nevada, with an estimated 
population of 754,000 people. The company's results of operations, like those of other 
utilities in the Northwest, can be significantly affected by changing weather, 
precipitation and streamflow conditions. Idaho Power relies heavily on hydroelectric 
power for its generating needs and is one of the nation's few investor-owned utilities 
with a predominantly hydro base
Idaho Power describes itself as the country’s leader in photovoltaic (solar) research and 
project implementation, with a subsidiary. Applied Power Corporation (APC) being 
North America’s most experienced photovoltaic system provider. Idaho Power 
Resources Corporation (IPRC), another subsidiary, focuses on exploring renewable 
energy technology, infrastructure development, and the related opportunities associated 
with communications technology and energy efficiency. Idaho Power’s strategy is to 
maintain its existing resource base, continue to expand and eventually commercialize its 
solar technology and approach deregulation with a defensive strategy, as discussed in a 
February 26, 1998 letter withdrawing its participation in IndeGO. According to Kip W. 
Runyan, Vice President of Delivery for Idaho Power, “The State of Idaho is facing the
I l l
prospects of electric industry restructuring and retail competition with considerable 
apprehension. Idaho electric rates are already among the lowest in the country and many 
people are concerned that restructuring will only bring higher prices and more problems 
to our state. This is the subject of current debate in both regulatory and legislative 
reforms with our state. We do not believe it to be appropriate for Idaho Power to take 
what would be perceived as a major step down the road to restructuring prior to the 
conclusion of this debate.” ®̂
With this stance, it is unlikely Idaho Power would be interested in a merger with MPC, 
which embraces deregulation. Given that Idaho Power and MPC are approximately of 
equal size, it is possible that MPC could utilize the cash generated by the sale of its 
generating assets, as well as its under-utilized debt capacity, to acquire Idaho Power. 
But this move would not be consistent with MPC’s strategy to grow in the California 
markets. In addition, while both companies express an interest in growing through new 
technology, Idaho’s solar technology and MPC’s telecommunications technology 
development do not create any natural synergies. Therefore, it is unlikely, MPC and 
Idaho would consolidate 
Washington W ater Power
The Washington Water Power Company (WWP) operates in the electric and natural gas 
utility businesses. The company employs 1,467 people in its utility operations and 
approximately 1,751 people in its majority-owned non-regulated businesses (energy and 
non-energy). WWP provides electricity and natural gas distribution and transmission 
services in a 26,000 square mile area in eastern Washington and Northern Idaho with a
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population of approximately 825,000 and also provides natural gas service in a 4,000 
square mile area in northeast and southwest Oregon and in the South Lake Tahoe region 
of California, with the population in these areas approximating 495,000. WWP’s 
corporate headquarters are in Spokane, Washington, which serves as the Inland 
Northwest's center for manufacturing, transportation, health care, education, 
communication, agricultural and service businesses.
Since 1996, WWP has reorganized its operations and purports to take advantage of the 
changes in the business environment and to proactively respond to regulatory and 
structural changes in the industry. Although WWP states that the restructuring 
reinforces a commitment to and advocacy of utility industry deregulation, the decision 
to withdraw from the FERC filing creating IndeGO indicates the company is taking a 
defensive strategy towards deregulation. The reason for the withdrawal from IndeGO is 
amplified by the 4 diagrams of electric rates in the U.S. (see Exhibit 15). WWP’s retail 
rates are among the lowest in the nation. Therefore, the company has little incentive to 
embrace deregulation.
According to Standard & Poor’s evaluation of WWP, “the company has an above 
average business profile along with an adequate financial profile. The strong business 
position reflects WWP’s low-risk hydroelectric operations, very competitive electric 
rates, and minimal rate needs Financial parameters are expected to modestly improve, 
given the company’s manageable capital program and annual electric retail sales 
growth, projected at about 1.7%. These factors should allow the cash flow interest 
coverage to stay around 3.5 times and funds from operations to average total debt to
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approximately 20%.”"̂  ̂ However, S&P cautions that WWP’s new energy services and 
energy marketing arms are of increasing concern given their inherently riskier business 
profiles. Overall, WWP’s outlook is stable. As previously mentioned, the P/E ratio may 
be adversely affected by the conservative stand on deregulation, in spite of the positive 
comments by industry analysts.
As with Idaho Power, a strategy to consolidate MPC with WWP would not make sense 
at this time, because of WWP’s and MPC’s opposite responses to deregulation. WWP 
withdrew its support of IndeGO for the same reason as Idaho Power, to protect some of 
the lowest utility rates in the nation. While MPC may be interested in securing low-cost 
generation to grow its market share in California, it is unlikely the company would want 
to sell off its own generating facilities, then turn around and purchase basically the same 
asset base in a company approximately the same size as MPC 
Pacific Gas & Electric
PG&E is the nation’s second largest publicly owned electric and gas utility. It serves 
almost 4.5 million electric customers and 3.7 million gas customers in Northern and 
Central California. Because of deregulation, the company is moving away from being a 
power supplier and toward being a power and gas distributor. Therefore, PG&E is 
divesting itself of its fossil-fuel power plants. Also, as previously mentioned, PG&E is 
promoting the Clean Choice line of environmentally-friendly electric supply options, 
which will correspond with the sale of its fbssil-fuel power plants.
MPC is considered by some analysts to be a direct competitor of PG&E in the 
California markets."*  ̂ This is probably due to MPC’s aggressive marketing plan in
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PG&E’s traditional service territory. However, it seems unlikely that MFC would prove 
a real threat to PG&E, given the difference in size between the two companies (PG&E 
is approximately 11 times the size of MPC) and PG&E’s already successful efforts of 
its marketing arm, PG&E Energy Services.
PG&E Energy Services has won several major energy supplier contracts in California. 
To date. Energy Services has entered into long-term power agreements that in total 
represent more than $1 billion in revenue and has opened offices in Atlanta, Baltimore, 
Bethesda, Boulder, Charlotte, Chicago, Columbia, S C , Houston, Little Rock, Costa 
Mesa, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, San Jose, 
Stockton and Tulsa. Testimonials state that Energy Services is a successful bidder 
because of guaranteed energy savings, long-term solutions based on the specific needs 
of the customer, and the ability to provide comprehensive billing and information 
management services. PG&E recently announced that it had entered into a landmark 
agreement with Safeway, Inc. to provide electricity and energy information 
management to all 400 Safeway and Von supermarkets, major office complexes, and 12 
support facilities throughout California.
There’s little support for a merger or acquisition between PG&E and MPC, with 
PG&E’s strategy to become a nationwide power and gas distributor. There is not 
enough consumer base in Montana to justify the investment, nor enough gas distribution 
capacity.
Edison International
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Edison International is the parent company of Southern Cal Edison, the #2 US electric 
utility in number of customers (4.2 million). SCE has responded to competition by 
selling several of its power plants and investing in subsidiaries that are in non- 
traditional arenas. The company supports new technology in California by supplying 
charging equipment for the electric-vehicle market in the state and is divested into 
unrelated fields such as public housing, industrial parks and financing companies. 
Edison Capital, an investment subsidiary, is a provider of capital and financial services 
for energy and infrastructure projects domestically and abroad. Its investments include 
interests in nuclear power, cogeneration, electric transmission, waste-to-energy, 
hydroelectric, transportation, telecommunications, and affordable housing facilities. 
Edison is diversified in many arenas, besides those mentioned above.
In addition, Edison is striving to develop creative solutions to energy needs by building 
strategic alliances. Edison EV, a subsidiary, is engaged in the business of providing 
services related to electric vehicles, including the distribution and installation of electric 
vehicle charging equipment. Edison EV has supplemented its existing alliances with 
General Motors and Saturn Corporation by forming ties to American Honda Motor 
Company, Toyota Motor Sales, Ford Motor Company, and to additional electric vehicle 
charging manufacturers, to serve electric vehicle customers nationwide.'*^
Edison International is also considered by some analysts to be a direct competitor to 
MPC. However, as with PG&E (the other company considered to be a direct competitor 
of MPC), the competition would be akin to a David and Goliath match. Edison is over 9
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times the size of MPC. Analysts may believe there is a competitor relationship because 
of MPC’s aggressive marketing program in Edison’s backyard.
Edison could decide that MPC would make sense to acquire for any or all of the 
following reasons: MPC is developing a successfiil marketing program for California; 
MPC has expertise in new growth areas, such as telecommunications, which may appeal 
to Edison’s desire to fiirther diversify; MPC is recognized as a top competitor of 
Edison; MPC, like Edison, has chosen to sell off its generating assets, concentrating in 
energy services/trading and new technologies; MPC will have available cash from the 
sale of its generating assets, which could be used to lower Edison’s debt position.
IV. Conclusion
As it has for many utilities across the nation, the issuance of FERC Order No. 888 has 
caused the most dramatic changes ever made at the Montana Power Company. To let go 
of the traditional reliance on guaranteed rate recovery and launch into opening up the 
company’s electric customer base to competition, as well as diving into energy trading 
and marketing in states far away, has been a giant step for MFC.
But even more dramatic was the company’s decision to sell its generating assets. As 
mentioned earlier. Bob Gannon has seen the future of electric deregulation for the 
vertically-integrated MFC. It encompasses price volatility and low prices, especially in 
electric generation. Gannon believed MFC could not withstand the tens of millions of 
dollars of losses it would undoubtedly incur before prices stabilized in the marketplace 
and the company’s stranded cost issues with the MFSC were resolved. So the company 
decided to sell its generating assets and change its focus, concentrating on electric 
distribution, oil and gas production, energy trading and telecommunications. 
Unfortunately, the sale price will be adversely effected by the failure to form a regional 
transmission grid (IndeGO), which would have eliminated the “pancaking” of 
transmission prices between Montana generating stations and major West Coast 
markets.
MFC’s strategic direction is not significantly different than the hypothesis of this paper, 
which stated that MFC would be unable to continue as a vertically-integrated utility, 
because of the new demands for efficiency in the deregulated marketplace. It was
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believed (in the hypothesis) that MPC was not large enough to compete effectively, nor 
did it have an adequate customer base to hold onto its position in the Montana 
electricity market. Therefore, the conclusion of the hypothesis was that MFC would 
have to merge with another Northwest utility in order to survive in the deregulated 
world. While it is still very possible and viable for MFC to merge with another 
Northwest utility, the merger would happen for different reasons than anticipated at the 
start of this study.
By selling off its generating assets, MFC has effectively nullified the need to survive by 
merging with another utility. By removing the need to achieve a balance between 
MFC’s large, diverse resource base and a market with a large number of customers, 
MFC has given itself some breathing room to assess the future from a strategic (rather 
than survival) viewpoint. MFC will become a buyer of electricity in the open market, a 
strategic direction taken by several of the companies evaluated, such as Pacific Gas & 
Electric and Edison International.
In addition, the sale will generate a large amount of cash for MFC’s energy trading and 
telecommunication businesses and will remove the need for a long, drawn-out battle 
with the MFSC over stranded cost recovery. This will help position the company in the 
areas it has chosen to compete in, such as energy trading and the bundling of energy 
services in California.
As mentioned briefly above, MFC may still chose to merge with another utility, even 
though the risks posed by deregulation will be minimized by the sale of its generating 
assets. A compelling reason for merger in today’s deregulated world may be to
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capitalize on combined strengths, minimize weaknesses and develop strategic alliances 
in the marketplace. For the first time, company’s can look at how their consolidated 
efforts can improve services, advance technological breakthroughs and reach markets 
previously inaccessible to traditional utilities.
For these reasons, MPC should look closely at a merger with Puget Sound Energy 
Puget and MPC have dealt with each other for many years, through the joint ownership 
of the Colstrip plants. Although the relationship has been strained at times, with court 
battles and binding arbitration over a variety of issues, the two management teams know 
each other and are familiar with each other’s company cultures. The recent settlement of 
several long-standing disputes between the two companies should allow for a more 
cordial relationship.
Further, the strategic direction of the two companies would blend well. Puget has 
become the largest gas utility in the Pacific Northwest, with the acquisition of 
Washington Natural Gas MPC has stated that it intends to stay in the oil and gas 
business, where it has over 40 years of expertise in oil and gas operations, in both the 
U.S. and Canada (where Puget has gas properties). Puget could draw on MPC’s 
expertise and could conceivably utilize MPC’s gas storage facilities and production for 
some seasonal load balancing and spot market opportunities.
Both companies are focusing on development of high value services, such as automated 
meter-based data retrieval and geographic information systems. With MPC’s expertise 
in automated dam monitoring equipment, as developed by its subsidiary Tetragenics, 
and the company’s telecommunications experience, a joint effort between MPC and
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Puget could potentially achieve more in technological advancement than either 
company could do alone.
The recent agreement between Puget and Duke Energy Trading, where the two 
companies have agreed to coordinate energy marketing and trading activities in 14 
western states and British Columbia, would enable MPC to market energy much more 
effectively than its current stand alone, relatively young trading floor. The expertise 
gained by an association with a large trading company (such as Duke), would help 
insure MPC’s survival in this new, cutthroat arena.
Consolidation of administrative functions would create savings almost immediately for 
the merged company, although it would require some time to blend the two corporate 
cultures. With Puget being about half again as large as MPC, in terms of revenue and 
assets, it’s assumed the corporate headquarters would reside at Puget’s offices in 
Bellevue, Washington.
Finally, and probably most important from a strategic viewpoint, is MPC’s fiber optic 
reach into the Seattle area. Puget’s large customer base would provide MPC’s Touch 
America with access to a large West Coast market that it currently does not have viable 
access to. With Touch America’s proven track record of high quality customer service 
at a low price, this market development could prove significant for both companies.
In summary, MPC has begun the steps to survive in a deregulated world, by undoing its 
vertical integration. The next step, to insure the company’s survival, may be to merge 
with Puget Sound Energy. The hypothesis stated that MPC would need to merge or 
acquire another Northwest utility in order to compete (or even survive) after
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deregulation. While the path may vary slightly with the sale of MPC’s generating 
assets, the outcome MFC should be heading toward confirms this hypothesis. Merging 
with Puget would make the most sense for the future of the Montana Power Company
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with MPC’s power-supply. Leaving early does not authorize a reduction in a 
customer’s CTC-SC obligation because of their choice. All customers must be 
held accountable for their share of the CTC-SC.
CTC-SC Risk
Q. Is it appropriate to say that retail customers will pay for 100 percent of the
CTC-SC and MPC will pay 0 percent during the transition period?
A. No, because the statement implies certainty. The statement will be true only if the
power-supply costs and market forecast used in the CTC-SC calculation turn out 
exactly as predicted. If the actual market prices are lower or the resource costs are 
higher than forecast, the CTC-SC will under collect out-of-market costs.
Likewise, the CTC-SC will over collect the out-of-market costs if the maricet price 
is higher or the resource costs are lower than forecast After the transition period, 
MPC’s power-supply will be sold at market prices without protection to MPC 
investors.
Q. Do you have an example of the CTC-SC dollar risk for the three market
price forecasts?
Graph 11
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Exhibit
K)VO
Comparison of MPC rates (as represented by Missoula) with other selected rates (by city)
Type of Service*
Exhibit
City ‘ Residential Small Commercial Large Commercial Small Industrial Large Industrial
Missoula, Montana (MPC) $ 60.19 $ 142.00 $ 7,482.00 $ 17,566.00 $ 97,051.00
Boise, Idaho $ 49.60 $ 89.00 $ 5,162.00 $ 11,039.00 $ 64,308.00
Spokane, Washington $ 46.53 $ 103.00 $ 7,725.00 $ 19,195.00 $ 84,517.00
Bellevue, Washington $ 55.58 $ 101.00 $ 8,848.00 $ 18,321.00 $ 95,690.00
Portland, Oregon $ 56.54 $ 99.00 $ 7,615.00 $ 17,592.00 $ 103,125.00
San Francisco, Calif. $ 127.18 $ 231.00 $ 18,537.00 $ 41,622.00 $ 195,288.00
Long Beach, Calif. $ 136.33 $ 191.00 $ 22,205.00 $ 49,032.00 $ 272,018.00
San Diego, Calif. $ 121.21 $ 182.00 $ 19,577.00 $ 44,070.00 $ 222,454.00
Reno, Nevada $ 87.93 $ 135.00 $ 10,992.00 $ 27,427.00 $ 155,407.00
Phoenix, Arzonia $ 98.69 $ 193.00 $ 12,651.00 $ 28,799.00 $ 142,218.00
Denver, Colorado $ 72.35 $ 104.00 $ 9,416.00 $ 20,785.00 $ 111,813.00
RmrAime ; :
Missoula, Montana (MPC) 5 7 2 2 4
Boise, Idaho 2 1 1 1 1
Spokane, Washington 1 4 4 5 2
Bellevue, Washington 3 3 5 4 3
Portland, Oregon 4 2 3 3 5
San Francisco, Calif. 10 11 9 9 9
Long Beach, Calif. 11 9 11 11 11
San Diego, Calif. 9 8 10 10 10
Reno, Nevada 7 6 7 7 8
Phoenix, Arzonia 8 10 8 8 7
Denver, Colorado 6 5 6 6 6
' Residential rales = monthly cost for 1,000 kWh energy 
Small Commercial = monthly cost for 12kW demand and 1,500 kWh energy 
Large Commercial = monthly cost for 500 W/V demand and 150,000 kWh energy 
Small Industrial = monthly cost for 1,000 kW demand and 400,000 kWh energy 
Large Industrial = monthly cost for 5,000 kW demand and 2,500,000 kWh energy
Exhibit 7  P s i o f z
Eachlbit _  (PR O O l)
Direct Maxket Access Rate Schedule
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ELECTRIC TARIFF Exhibit 7  P g-2 o f 2
m p n Sheet No. 99.9
•ntEHOHTANAPOwEKCOMFAHY Canceling   Sheet No. 99.9 ^
Schedule No. DMA-1
DIRECT MARKET ACCESS SERVICE
Ap p licah ilifv  Applicable to Customers electing to purchase supply from Registered Power Suppliers for the 
period July 1 .1998 through June 30.2002. subject to the following transition schedule:
July 1.1998 to June 30. 2000 
Residential Rate Class
Residential Customer Choice Program limited to 3.000 Residential customers (100% of individual 
loads).
General Service Primary & Secondary (GS-1). Imeation Rate Classes
Commercial Customer Choice Program limited up to 1.000 GS-1 and Irrigation Customers (100% of 
individual loads) but not to exceed 56.000.000 kWh(s) per year.
General Service Substation & Transmission (GS-2)
One-third (l/3rd) of each customer's total load factored power supply loads, in MWh, as reflected in 
Ae Utility's 1995 Test Period in Docket No. 96.____
July 1. 2000 to June 30. 2002
Residential Rat<> Cla«
Residential Customer Choice Program Ihnited to 25,000 Residential customers (100% of individual 
loads).
GS-1. Inigarinn Ran» Çla<w
Conunercial Customer Choice Program limited up to 5,000 GS-1 and Irrigation Customers (100% of 
individual loads) but not to exceed 280,000.000 kWh(s) per year.
GS-2
Two-thirds (2/3rds) of each customer's total load factored power supply loads, in MWh, as reflected 
in Ae Utility's 1995 Test Period in Docket No. 96.____
July 1.2002
Full power supply choice for retail sales.
RATES: Net Monthly Bill:
ACCCTS RaK:
Standard R ate S ch ed u le
$0.02688 
$0.02035 
$0.00340 
$0.02601 
$0.14293
Plus:
Transmission Service & Ancillary Services
Billing for Transmission Service and for Ancillary Services provided hereunder shall be in 
accordance wiA the provisions of the Montana Power Company - Services Division's (Utility) 
Open Access Transmission Tariff, on file with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
______________________________________________ (continued)_______________________________________
ISSUED BY; Perry J .  Cole     TTTLE; Vice P resident_______
R-1 AllkWh®
GS-1 AlIkWh@
GS-2 AU kWh @
IS-1 AU kWh @
L-1 AU kWh @
TARIFF LETTER NO.; _________________________  EFFECTIVE:
APPROVED;______________________________
Public Service C om m ission  ol M o n tan a
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The Montana Power Company
Exhibit 8
Pg. 1 of 7
Five Year Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
MTP Q uarter  ®  EMA<20>:iM*3
HIM I T n T r r r r f l
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Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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PacifiCorp
Exhibit 8
Pg. 2 o f  7
Five Year Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
PPU Q uarter
Volume —
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Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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Puget Sound Power & Light Company
Five Year Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
4f t
I i f l D i n
Volume —
28
25
22
19
ip.
1 3 .6  
1 0 .5  *
7 .4  -
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1.1
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Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
134
Idaho Power Company
Exhibit 8
P g . 4 c f 7
Five Year Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
IDA Q uarter  ■  -
33
30
27
24
Volume —
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Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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The W ashington W ater Power Company
Five Year Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
WJP Q uarter  * #  ::C^EMA<20)
Volume “ ■
l l i i i l l i l l l l l l l l l l l l .
J S D 9 4 J S D 9 5 J S D 9 6 J S D 9 7 J  S D 9 8 J
7 . 4
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4 . 0  -
0.6
Source: Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Company Breifing Books
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Five Y ear Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
PCC Q u a r t tf r  ®  , ;-.
I
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I
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Edison International
Five Year Stock Perform ance & Volume
(June 1994-June 1998, by quarter)
EIX Q u a r t e r *  rv EMA<2Q):9iie^^
Volume —
Il l l l l i l i l l l l l l l l l i i
8 1 .2
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M ontana Pow er Co*
Symbol: MTP
Five-Year Total Return
MTP
— *— OJ W «st. U.S. Ele. Util.
I . I DJ Equity Market Index
(cumulaUve, roonUity Uirough Ju*e 26, 1996)
(2.91) ---- (3.36) ----  ’ 2.79 ----
11.13 ----- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
1157 ----- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
5856 5856 22.05 22X15 29.38 29.38
83.19 ' 35.35 44.51 2021 72.96 31.51
82.07 f 12.73 46.63 7.96 179.37 22.81
All figures in percent. V'-;"
Tot&l Return: All cash distributions and capital changes are taken into consideration in the of total return.
Cash distributions are considered leinrested as of ihe Ex-dividend date. '
Source: IDD Information Services
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Pacificorp
Symbol: PPW
Five-Year Total Return
- PPW
DJ W est U S Ele. Util 
]  DJ Equity Market Index
(cumubthre, monthly through Jun« 26, 1996)
m
(7.05) ----- (326) -  2.79 ----
(16.48) ---- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
(17.63) ---- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
5.37 5.37 22.05 22.05 29.38 29.38
12.30 5.97 44.51 20.21 72.96 31.51
55.86 928 46.63 7.96 179.37 22.81
All figures in percent.
T(Aa1 Return: A ll cAsh distributions and capital changes are talccn into consideration in the calculation of total return. 
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.'
Source: DDD Information Ser\dces
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P u get S ou n d  E nergy Inc.
Symbol: PSD
Five-Year Total Return
196%
147
—  PSD 
— — DJ W est. U S. Ele. Util 
< DJ Equity Market Index
(cttinubthre, monthty tttrough June 26, 19f ^
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 II
(2.46) ----- (3.36) ---- 2.79 ----
0 (7.57) ---- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
(9.10) ---- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
770 770 22.05 22.05 29.38 29.38
29.94 13.99 44.51 2021 72.96 31.51
3959 6.90 46.63 7.96 179.37 22.81
A ll ûguxes in percent.
Tctml Return: A ll c&sb. diitiibuti<ms and capxt&l change* are tmken into considexation in the ra tm i.tim  of total return. 
Ca5h dirtnbution* are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date. "
Source: EDD Information Services
s
cr
to
w
5.
N
4:̂K)
Idaho Pow er Co.
Symbol: IDA
Five-Year Total Return
IDA
— — DJ Ctl. U.S. Ele Util.
DJ Equity M arket Index
(cumubtlve, monthly Utrongh Jtin« 26, 1996)
195%
156
117
78
39
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
(5.72) ---- (3.37) 2.79 ----
(3.19) ----- 1.82 ---- 16.51 ----
(5.92) ' ----- 1.82 ---- 16.51 ----
17.81 17.81 27.39 27.39 29.38 29.38
29 JO 13.89 36.16 16.69 72.96 31.51
55.01 9.16 63.60 10.35 179.37 22.81
A ll figures in percent.
Total Return: All cash, distributions end capital changes are taken into oonsideiation in the calculation of total return. 
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.
Source: IDD Information Services
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W ashington  W ater Pow er Co.
Symbol: WWP
Five-Year Total Return
WWP
— — DJ W est U S Ele Util
J  DJ Equity M arket Index
(cumiii3tUve,monUily ttirough Jua«26, 15>9S>
(6.39) ' (326) ' ---- 2.79 ----
(4.63) , ---- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
(5.12) 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
25.97 25.97 . 22.05 22 A5 29.38 29.38
3820 17.56 44.51 2021 72.96 31.51
60.62 9.94 46.63 7.96 179.37 22.81
All figures in percent.
Tot&l Return: All cash distributions and capital changes are taken into consideration in the calculation of total return. 
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.
Source: IDD Information Services
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Pg&E Corp.
Symbol: PCG
Five-Year Total Return
PCG
— — DJ W est. U.S. Ele. Util.
J  DJ Equity M arket Index
(cttjnttktthre, monUily Uirough June 26, 1990)
192%
144
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
179.37
A il figure* in percent.
Total Return: All cash distributions end capital changes are taken into consideration in the calculation of total return. 
Cash distributions are considered reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.
Source; IDD Iiifonnatioii Services
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E dison  In tern ation al
Symbol: EIX
Five-Year Total Return
  EIX
— — DJ W est. U.S. Ele. Uiil.
' I DJ Equity Market Index
(cwnubUve, monU»^ through June 26,19#^
172%
0.05 ----- (336) ^ ---- 2.79 • ----
1124 ----- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
9.47 ---- 0.30 ---- 16.51 ----
2257 2257 22.05 2235 S> 29.38 29.38
8959 37.80 44.51 2021 72.96 31.51
5773 954 46.63 7.96 179.37 22.81
A il rigures in percent.
Total Retuzn: A ll cash distributions and capital changes axe taken into consideration in the calculation of total xetuxn. 
Cash distnbutions are consideied reinvested as of the Ex-dividend date.
Source: IDD Information Services
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Statement of Income
($ Millions, excepf per share amount)
Montana Power Co.
Exhibit 10 Page 1 of 4
PaciflCorp
1997 1996 1995 1997 1996 1995
Operating Revenues $ 1,024 $ 973 $ 953 $ 6,278 $ 3.804 $ 2,807
Expenses;
Operations & Maintenance $ 
Administrative & General (where information was provided) $ 
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization $ 
Taxes Other Than Income $ 
Special Charges
492
124
95
96
$
$
$
$
450
113
86
88
$
$
$
$
$
488
104
85
90
74
$ 4,394 
$ 335 
$ 477
$ 100 
$ 170
$
$
$
S
1,949
245
424
99
$
$
$
$
1,292
187
334
104
Total Expenses $ 607 $ 737 $ 841 $ 5,476 $ 2,717 $ 1,917
Income from Operations $ 217 $ 236 $ 112 $ 802 $ 1,087 $ 890
Interest Expense/Other $ 26 $ 44 $ 33 $ 468 $ 420 $ 297
Income from Continuing Operations (t>efore income taxes) $ 191 $ 192 $ 79 $ 334 8 667 $ 593
Income Tax Expense $ 62 $ 72 $ 22 $ 110 $ 236 $ 192
Income from Continuing Operations $ 129 $ 120 $ 57 $ 224 $ 431 $ 401
Discontinued Operations $ * % - $ - $ 438 $ 75 $ 103
Net Income $ 129 $ 120 $ 57 $ 662 $ 506 $ 504
Preferred Dividends $ 4 $ 8 $ 7 $ 23 $ 30 $ 39
Net Income Available for Common $ 125 $ 112 $ 50 $ 639 $ 476 $ 465
EPS-Common Stock $ 2.29 % 2.03 $ 0.92 $ 2.16 $ 1.62 $ 1.64
Statement of Income
($ Millions, except per share amount)
Puget Sound Energy
Exhibit 10 P age  2 o f 4 
Idaho Power
1997 1996 1995 1997 1996 1995
Operating Revenues $ 1,677 $ 1,649 $ 1,631 $ 749 $ 578 $ 546
Expenses;
Operations & Maintenance
Administrative & General (where information was provided) 
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization 
Taxes Other Than Income 
Special Charges
$
$
$
$
$
1,015
21
162
160
56
$
$
$
$
$
920
32
144
156
5
$
$
$
$
$
949
29
141
151
$ 333 
$ 138 
$ 72 
$ 21
$
$
$
$
168
133
70
21
$
$
$
$
154
127
67
23
Total Expenses $ 1,414 $ 1,257 $ 1,270 $ 564 $ 392 $ 371
Income from Operations $ 263 $ 392 $ 361 $ 185 $ 186 $ 175
Interest Expense/Other $ 90 $ 117 $ 142 $ 46 $ 44 $ 41
Income from Continuing Operations (tiefore income taxes) $ 173 $ 275 $ 219 $ 139 % 142 $ 134
Income Tax Expense $ 48 $ 107 $ 92 $ 46 $ 52 $ 48
Income from Continuing Operations $ 125 $ 168 $ 127 $ 93 $ 90 $ 86
Discontinued Operations $ (3) $ (2) $ (27) $ - $ -
Net Income $ 122 $ 166 $ 100 $ 93 $ 90 8 86
Preferred Dividends $ 17 $ 22 $ 22 $ 5 $ 7 8 8
Net Income Available for Common $ 105 $ 144 $ 78 $ 88 $ 83 8 78
EPS-Common Stock $ 1.25 % 1.70 $ 0.94 8 2.32 $ 2.21 8 2.10
00
Statement of Income
($ MiHions, except per shere amount)
WWP
Exhibit 10 P ag e  3 o f 4 
PG&E
1997 1996 1995 1997 1996 1995
Operating Revenues $ 1.302 $ 945 $ 755 $ 15,400 $ 9,610 $ 9,622
Expenses:
Operations & Maintenance $ 
Administrative & General (where information was provided) $ 
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization $ 
Taxes Other Than Income $ 
Special Charges
896
97
70
50
$
$
$
$
560
77
72
49
$
$
$
%
388
62
68
47
$
$
11,783
1,889
$
$
6,492
1,222
$
$
5,499
1,360
Total Expenses $ 1.113 $ 758 $ 565 $ 13,672 $ 7,714 % 6,859
Income from Operations $ 189 $ 187 $ 190 $ 1,728 $ 1,896 $ 2,763
Interest Expense/Other $ 14 $ 54 $ 50 $ 464 $ 645 $ 599
Income from Continuing Operations (before Income taxes) $ 175 $ 133 $ 140 $ 1.264 $ 1,251 $ 2,164
Income Tax Expense $ 61 $ 50 $ 53 $ 548 % 555 $ 895
Income from Continuing Operations $ 114 $ 83 $ 87 $ 716 $ 696 1 1,269
Discontinued Operations $ ■- $ - % - $ - % - $ -
Net Income $ 114 $ 83 $ 87 $ 716 % 696 $ 1,269
Preferred Dividends $ 5 $ 8 $ 9 $ - $ - $ -
Net Income Available for Common $ 109 $ 75 $ 78 $ 716 $ 696 $ 1,269
EPS-Common Stock $ 1.96 $ 1.35 $ 1.41 $ 1.75 $ 1.75 $ 2.99
statement of Income
($ Millions, except per share amount)
Exhibit 10 P ag e  4  of 4 
Edison International
1997 1996 1995
Operating Revenues $ 9,235 $ 8,545 $ 8,405
Expenses:
Operations & Maintenance $ 5,704 $ 5.134 $ 5,276
Administrative & General (wtiere information was provided) $ - $ - $ -
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization $ 1,362 $ 1,173 $ 1,014
Taxes Other Than Income $ 134 $ 197 $ 210
Special Charges $ 56 $ 86 $ 45
Total Expenses $ 7,256 $ 6,592 $ 6.545
Income from Operations $ 1,979 $ 1,953 $ 1,860
Interest Expense/Other $ 742 $ 673 $ 593
Income from Continuing Operations (before income taxes) $ 1,237 % 1,280 $ 1,267
Income Tax Expense $ 537 $ 563 $ 528
Income from Continuing Operations $ 700 $ 717 $ 739
Discontinued Operations
Net Income $ 700 $ 717 $ 739
Preferred Dividends
Net Income Available for Common $ 700 $ 717 $ 739
EPS-Common Stock $ 1.75 9 1.64 $ 1.66
Balance Sheet
($ Millions)
Montana Power Co.
Exhibit 11 Page 1 of 4
PaciflCorp
1997 1996 1997 1996
Assets
Current A ssets
C ash  & C ash  Equivalents $ 17 $ 32 $ 741 $ 8
Short-term  Investm ents $ - $ -
Accounts Receivable $ 127 $ 142 $ 920 $ 621
Net A ssets of Discontinued O perations $ 272 $ 780
Inventories & Prepaym ents $ 89 $ 88 $ 194 $ 181
Other Current A ssets $ 11 $ 11 $ 55 $ 72
Total Current A ssets $ 244 $ 273 $ 2,182 $ 1,662
Property, Plant & Equipm ent $ 2,997 $ 2,903 $ 13,313 $ 13,130
Accumulated Depreciation $ 946 $ 961 $ 4,242 $ 3,862
Net Property, Plant & Equipm ent $ 2,051 $ 1,942 $ 9,070 $ 9,267
O ther Non-current A ssets $ 506 $ 483 $ 2,628 $ 2,883
Total Non-current A ssets $ 2,557 $ 2,425 $ 11,698 $ 12,150
Total A ssets $ 2.801 $ 2,698 $ 13,880 $ 13,812
L iabilities and  E quity
Current Liabilities
Short-term borrowings $ 134 $ 105 $ 189 $ 684
Current portion of Long-term debt $ 82 $ 69 $ 366 $ 220
Accounts Payable $ 115 $ 97 $ 631 $ 478
Accrued Taxes $ 52 $ 53 $ 701 $ 291
O ther current liabilities $ 35 $ 41 $ 219 $ 84
Total Current Liabilities $ 418 $ 365 $ 2,106 $ 1,755
Long-term debt $ 653 $ 633 $ 4,415 $ 4,829
Deferred Income Taxes $ 340 $ 333 $ 1,676 $ 1,801
Deferred Tax Credits $ 35 $ 44 $ 135 $ 143
Other Non-current Liabilities $ 222 $ 229 $ 646 $ 728
Total Non-current Liabilities $ 1,250 $ 1,239 $ 6,872 $ 7,502
Stockholder Equity
Preferred Stock $ 123 $ 123 $ 582 $ 523
Common Stock $ 695 $ 692 $ 3,274 $ 3,237
Retained Earnings $ 315 $ 279 $ 1,047 $ 796
Total Stockholder Equity $ 1,133 $ 1,094 $ 4,903 $ 4,556
Total Liabilities & Stockholder Equity $ 2,801 $ 2,698 $ 13,880 $ 13.812
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Idaho  Pow er
1997 1996 1997 1996
Assets
C urrent A sse ts
C ash  & C ash  Equivalents $ 8 $ 4 $ 7 $ 8
Short-term  investm ents
A ccounts R eceivable $ 158 $ 159 $ 123 $ 51
Net A sse ts  of D iscontinued O perations
Inventories & P rep ay m en ts $ 59 $ 72 $ 54 $ 57
O ther C urrent A sse ts $ 123 $ 142 $ 33 $ 28
Total C urrent A ssets $ 348 $ 377 $ 217 $ 144
Property, Plant & Equipm ent $ 5,144 $ 4 ,890 $ 2,711 $ 2,619
A ccum ulated D epreciation $ 1,613 $ 1,493 $ 942 $ 887
Net Property, Plant & E quipm ent $ 3,531 $ 3,397 $ 1,769 $ 1,732
O ther N on-current A sse ts $ 615 $ 453 $ 420 $ 420
Total N on-current A sse ts $ 4,146 $ 3,850 $ 2,189 $ 2,152
Total A sse ts $ 4.494 $ 4,227 $ 2,406 $ 2.296
Liabilities and Equity
C urrent Liabilities
Short-term  borrow ings $ 373 $ 298 $ 58 $ 54
C urrent portion of Long-term  d eb t $ 51 $ 100 $ 30 $ -
A ccounts Payab le $ 117 $ 96 $ 112 $ 36
A ccrued T axes $ 74 $ 57 $ 24 $ 17
O ther current liabilities $ 76 $ 149 $ 35 $ 33
Total C urrent Liabilities $ 691 $ 700 $ 259 $ 140
Long-term d eb t $ 1,412 $ 1,166 $ 704 $ 739
D eferred Incom e T axes $ 629 $ 587 $ 424 $ 412
D eferred Tax C redits $ 130 $ 94 $ 70 $ 71
O ther N on-current Liabilities $ 131 $ 132
Total N on-current Liabilities $ 2,171 $ 1,847 $ 1,329 $ 1,354
Stockholder Equity
Preferred  S tock $ 273 $ 303 $ 107 $ 107
C om m on S tock $ 1,312 $ 1,292 $ 452 $ 452
R etained Earnings $ 47 $ 85 $ 259 $ 243
Total S tockholder Equity $ 1,632 $ 1,680 $ 818 $ 802
Total Liabilities & S tockholder Equity $ 4,494 $ 4,227 $ 2,406 $ 2.296
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PG&E
1997 1996
Assets
C urrent A sse ts
1997 1996
C ash  & C ash  E quivalents $ 31 $ 8 $ 237 $ 131
Short-term  Investm ents $ 23 $ 20 $ 1,160 $ 13
A ccounts R eceivable $ 177 $ 149 $ 3,002 $ 1,983
Net A sse ts  of D iscontinued O perations
Inventories & P rep ay m en ts $ 70 $ 52 $ 626 $ 584
O ther C urrent A sse ts $ 76 $ - $ -
Total C urrent A ssets $ 377 $ 229 $ 5,025 $ 2,711
Property, P lant & E quipm ent $ 2 ,276 $ 2,140 $ 36,513 $ 33,310
A ccum ulated  D epreciation $ 635 $ 592 $ 16,041 $ 14,302
Net Property. P lant & E quipm ent $ 1,641 $ 1,548 $ 20 ,472 $ 19,008
O ther N on-current A sse ts $ 394 $ 401 $ 5,060 $ 4 ,518
Total N on-current A sse ts $ 2 ,035 $ 1,949 $ 25,532 $ 23,526
Total A sse ts $ 2 ,412 $ 2 ,178 $ 30,557 $ 26,237
L iabilities a n d  Equity
C urrent Liabilities
Short-term  borrow ings $ - $ - $ 103 $ 681
Current portion of Long-term  d eb t $ - $ - $ 784 $ 210
A ccounts P ayab le $ 154 $ 95 $ 2,132 $ 1,426
A ccrued T axes $ 36 $ 37 $ 226 $ 310
O ther curren t liabilities $ 149 $ 71 $ 739 $ 653
Total C urrent Liabilities $ 339 $ 203 $ 3,984 $ 3,280
Long-term deb t $ 762 $ 765 $ 10,435 $ 7,770
Deferred Incom e T axes $ 353 $ 313 $ 4,029 $ 3,941
D eferred Tax C redits $ 17 $ 43 $ 339 $ 380
O ther N on-current Liabilities $ 36 $ 28 $ 2,034 $ 1,663
Total N on-current Liabilities $ 1,168 $ 1,149 $ 16,837 $ 13,754
Stockholder Equity
Preferred  S tock $ 155 $ 115 $ 839 $ 839
C om m on S tock $ 577 $ 580 $ 6,366 $ 5,728
R etained E arn ings $ 173 $ 131 $ 2,531 $ 2 ,636
Total S tockholder Equity $ 905 $ 826 $ 9,736 $ 9,203
Total Liabilities & S tockho lder Equity $ 2 ,412 $ 2 .178 $ 30,557 $ 26,237
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Edison Intl.
Assets
1997 1996
Current Assets
Cash & Cash Equivalents $ 1,907 $ 897
Short-term investments
Accounts Receivable $ 1,077 $ 1,095
Net Assets of Discontinued Operations
Inventories & Prepayments $ 297 $ 340
Other Current Assets $ 316 $ 240
Total Current Assets $ 3,597 $ 2,572
Property, Plant & Equipment $ 19,087 $ 19,575
Accumulated Depreciation $ 4,970 $ 4,302
Net Property, Plant & Equipment $ 14,117 $ 15,273
Other Non-current Assets $ 7,387 $ 6,714
Total Non-current Assets $ 21,504 $ 21,987
Total Assets $ 25,101 $ 24,559
Liabilities and Equity
Current Liabilities
Short-term borrowings $ 330 $ 397
Current portion of Long-term debt $ 868 $ 592
Accounts Payable $ 441 $ 438
Accrued Taxes $ 577 $ 530
Other current liabilities $ 1,512 $ 1,481
Total Current Liabilities $ 3,728 $ 3,438
Long-term debt $ 8,871 $ 7,475
Deferred Income Taxes $ 4,085 $ 4,283
Deferred Tax Credits $ 351 $ 372
Other Non-current Liabilities $ 1,930 $ 1,885
Total Non-current Liabilities $ 15,237 $ 14,015
Stockholder Equity
Preferred Stock $ 609 $ 709
Common Stock $ 2,351 $ 2,644
Retained Eamings $ 3,176 $ 3,753
Total Stockholder Equity $ 6,136 $ 7,106
Total Liabilities & Stockholder Equity $ 25,101 $ 24,559
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